Whether the lower courts are correct to apply this Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), to cases brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and require plaintiffs asserting claims for interference and retaliation in violation of that statute to prove but-for causation rather than the motivating factor causation.

2. Whether the regulations of the United States Department of Labor providing for a mixed motive or motivating factor standard to apply to claims brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 are entitled to controlling deference under this Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

3. Whether Petitioner James Zavaglia was erroneously denied a jury trial on his claims for interference and retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 when it was explicitly found that the Respondent gave one rationale for his termination at the time he was terminated and discovery evidence shows a different rationale later, by presenting other substantial evidence that his request for leave was a motivating factor in the termination decision.

4. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., held in action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, that a plaintiff may ordinarily prove the existence of an unlawful motive by establishing a prima facie case and demonstrating the falsity of the employer's proffered explanation for the disputed employment, and that a plaintiff who does so need not also offer some other additional evidence of discrimination. That the existence of an unlawful motive may not be established in that manner; a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case and the falsity of an employer's proffered reason is required to also adduce additional evidence of discrimination. The question presented is: Does the standard of proof established by Reeves apply as part of the civil action.

5. That two judges with ties to the Respondent had to be recused from the rehearing and rehearing en banc proceedings possibly within the parameters of 28 U.S. Code § 455. Should the Appeals Court have called upon guest judges so that the Plaintiff-Appellant could have had the benefit of an en banc panel in its entirety.

6. Terminating the Pro Se Applicant while he was on intermittent Family Medical Leave Act for medical situations stemming from an assault on the job by a fourth medical student, which caused a permanent back and hip injuries resulting in the petitioner being put on social security disability, who is now a practicing doctor because the assault was covered up by upper management within the University. Should the University be held and individuals be held criminally responsible for their actions with retaliation with the advent of such cases as ERIKA DAVIS v. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; LAWRENCE GERARD NASSAR (individual capacity only); KATHIE KLAGES (individual capacity only); WILLIAM D. STRAMPEL, D.O. (individual capacity only); JEFFREY K. KOVAN D.O. (individual capacity only); DOUGLAS DIETZEL, D.O. (individual capacity only); BROOKE LEMMEN, D.O. (individual capacity only); GARY E. STOLLAK (individual capacity only); DESTINY TEACHNOR-HAUK (individual capacity only); USA GYMNASTICS, INC.; TWISTARS USA, d/b/a GEDDERTS' TWISTARS USA GYMNASTICS CLUB, and JOHN GEDDERT 1

Whether the lower courts are correct to apply Nassar to FMLA cases