1. Should sexual discrimination claims under Title VII
and Title IX be analyzed under the traditional McDonnell
Douglas "but-for " test as the Sixth, Eight and Ninth
Circuits have held, or under the broader "reasonable
calculation " test as the Second and Fourth Circuits have
held, or under the even broader "increased likelihood " /
"convincing mosaic " tests as the First, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have held?

2. Should disability discrimination claims under the
FMLA require an actual denial of leave by the employer as
the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have held, or is mere discouragement of leave
enough to sustain a claim as the Seventh Circuit has held;
and should such claims be analyzed under the traditional
McDonnell Douglas "but-for " test as the Fourth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits have held, or the broader "motivating
factor " test as the Second and Third Circuits have held?

3. Should the employer 's failure to prove that "just
cause " exists for discipline of an employee subject to a
collective bargaining agreement constitute pretext under
McDonnell Douglas?

Whether federal courts of appeal are divided on standards for sexual harassment, disability discrimination, and collective bargaining agreement interpretation