Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits an employer from discharging an individual "because of such individual's . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In Africa v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit stated, "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing [an individual] a blanket privilege to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests." This Court's holdings dictate broad protections for religious beliefs. However, in many cases, district courts have used this "blanket privilege" theory to constrict this Court's broad protections and hold that some avowed religious beliefs are too broad to be afforded protection, or are personal or medical beliefs rather than religious beliefs.

1. Under Title VII, is an employee's religious belief left unprotected if a court determines such a belief would create a "blanket privilege" because the belief might apply broadly to other employment situations, or is an employee's religious belief broadly protected in the employment setting as found by six other circuits?

2. Are lower courts permitted to make a factual determination as to whether a professed religious belief supported by citations to religious materials is a personal or medical belief as opposed to an avowed religious belief on a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6)?

Whether an employee's religious belief under Title VII is unprotected if a court determines it would create a 'blanket privilege' or is broadly protected as found by six other circuits; and whether lower courts can make factual determinations about the nature of a religious belief on a motion to dismiss