1. Must the "use of physical force" required to establish a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) be personal to the defendant convicted of using a firearm during that crime of violence under § 924(c), , 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and United States u. Davis, U.S. _, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019)?

2. Does the least conduct needed to prove a co-conspirator's liability for a principal's substantive violent crime under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), necessarily satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s requisite use of physical force; or do fundamentals of statutory construction, due process, double jeopardy, and criminal intent, prohibit obtaining § 924(c) convictions and their predicate violent felonies pursuant to Pinkerton?

3. Does the least-culpable conduct needed to establish an accomplice's liability for a felony, such as Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951(a), categorically satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A)'s requisite use of physical force to permit such accomplices to be convicted of using a firearm in relation to that felony under § 924(c)?

Must the use of physical force required to establish a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) be personal to the defendant convicted of using a firearm during that crime of violence under § 924(c)