No. 19-6707

Ricky Lee Tyndall v. United States

Lower Court: Fourth Circuit
Docketed: 2019-11-21
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: crime-of-violence criminal-law due-process element-of-force federal-criminal-law force-clause hobbs-act physical-force property-damage property-rights sentencing-enhancement statutory-interpretation vagueness
Latest Conference: 2020-01-10
Question Presented (from Petition)

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s FORCE CLAUSE requires the use of "physical force" (i.e: "violence force" meaning "force capable of causing PHYsICAL in Dimaya) against the person OR PRoPERTY of another. How is any court meant (H to determine what constitutes enough "physical force against property" to equate to what might result in "physical pain or injury to a person," since property cannot itself sustain an injury causing "pain."... Could. § 924(c)(3)(A) also be "unconstitutionally vague" due to the included [use of physical force against "property,"] a term that was NOT used in any of the other definitions provided for a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 16, USSG § 4B1.2, or USSG. § 2L1.2...

Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s force clause is unconstitutionally vague due to the inclusion of 'physical force against property' as a basis for a 'crime of violence'

Docket Entries

2020-01-13
Petition DENIED.
2019-12-05
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/10/2020.
2019-12-02
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2019-11-07
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due December 23, 2019)

Attorneys

Ricky Tyndall
Ricky Lee Tyndall — Petitioner
United States
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent