The National Bank Act grants federally chartered national banks enumerated and incidental powers, subject to federal regulators' detailed proscriptions and extensive supervision. Given this reticulated federal scheme, the Court has long recognized that the National Bank Act preempts state laws that "prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its powers." Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). Congress codified that preemption standard in the Dodd-Frank Act. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).

Two years ago, in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., 602 U.S. 205, 219-20 (2024), this Court held that bank preemption presents a legal question answered through a "nuanced comparative analysis." Specifically, courts must compare the "nature and degree of the interference caused by [the challenged] state law" to the nature and degree of the interferences at issue in seven bank-preemption precedents of this Court. Id.

But not all courts got the message. In the decision below, the First Circuit purported to apply Cantero in declining to hold that the National Bank Act preempts Rhode Island's law mandating payment of interest on mortgage-escrow accounts. Yet the court brushed off several of the precedents this Court instructed it to examine and made other errors that place its decision in direct conflict with Cantero.

Once again, the question presented is:

Whether the National Bank Act preempts state interest-on-escrow laws like Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 19-92(a), which purport to dictate how national banks price their mortgage-loan products.

Whether the National Bank Act preempts state interest-on-escrow laws that dictate how national banks price their mortgage-loan products