1. Does the Ohio court's dedsiofi to invalidate a Jewish Ketufaah as an
unenforceable "promise to marry " and void as against public policy conflict with
decisions of other state coasts ihat-have iBsxjgsizedxeligioiis marriage contracts as
valid and enforceable agreements, thereby creating a si
rights that must be resolved by the XJ.S, Supreme Court?

2. Should rehgimis mama ga contracts, that protect women of faitirbased
be deemed valid under the East ikaentfaeni 's Free Exercise Clause,
the liberty and property protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
be mifer agotral principle s of contact law consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court 's decision in denes v_ Wolf, 443B.S. 595 (1979)?

3. Does the Ohio court 's refusal to apply neutral principles of law to interpret and
or.Tmw» ft J^gyab Bwte with the DUEL Supreme Court 's decision in Jones
v. Wolf; 443 UJ3- 595 (1979), which held that courts may resolve disputes involving
religious entities by applying neutral principles of law without violating the
Establishment Clause?

Whether Ohio courts improperly invalidated a Jewish marriage contract (Ketubah) by refusing to enforce religious marriage agreements and applying inconsistent legal principles