John J. Dierlam v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al.
1) Is it a proper exercise of discretion for an Appeals Court to sanction raising the bar presented by the elements of standing and mootness to a virtually unattainable level despite an admission of guilt by the defendants, evidence of continuing and expanding violations to which they admitted culpability, and for the growing injuries caused by these violations especially in the pleading phase as indicated by Supreme Court precedent? Ride 10(a) and (c) is involved here.
2) The lower court decisions conflict with Janus v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. June 27, 2018) as the ACAin like manner creates a compelled association thus evoking ride 10(c).
3) Much evidence indicates that the health insurance companies are "State Actors, " which violate Constitutional Rights of citizens on behalf of the government. The evidence is greater than that presented in previous cases, and the ACA may have served as a template for the government 's continuing coercion of other business. Rule 10(c) is again evoked.
4) The 7th circuit decision Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) indicated that RFRA provides an entitlement to prospective relief as well as retrospective relief. The District Court ruled in my favor for retrospective relief after the remand and vacatur but denied prospective relief. The appeals court upheld the lower court ruling thereby setting up a conflict between the circuit courts on this issue evoking rule 10(a).
5) The religious exemptions in the ACA provide certain religions an advantage of less government regulation but the exemptions have no relationship to the stated goals of the ACA. Therefore these exemptions are in contradiction to Larson v. Valente, 456 US 228 (Supreme Court 1982) and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 US 703 (Supreme Court 1985). By refusing such relief to other religions, the ACA creates a ghetto based upon religion rather than race as in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). Thereby the government has also created an unequal playing field for some market participants. Rule 10(a) and (c) is evoked here as well.
6) As this case is over 8 years old and has not had a fair hearing on the issues, I would ask this court to rule on the merits of each of the other claims in the 3AC not mentioned above and provide the requested relief. Any further delay will result in a gross miscarriage of justice and continued harm to the public. As the lower court decisions are in conflict with previous decisions of this court, Rule 10(a) and (c) are evoked. Without very specific instructions and directions from this court, similar subterfuge can be expected from the lower courts if any further litigation would be required
Is it proper for an appeals court to raise the bar for standing and mootness to an unattainable level despite evidence of continuing violations and admitted guilt by defendants?