David H. Jacob v. Rosalyn Cotton, Chairperson, Nebraska Board of Parole, et al.
1. Do Nebraska's current parole procedures still meet the requirements of the 14th Amendment's Due Process clause under the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and used by the Greenholtz Court?
2. In the liberty interest in parole context, does "the opportunity to be heard" no longer guarantee "notice and a meaningful opportunity to rebut" the evidence the Parole Board relies upon for its decision?
3. Does it now require a state statutory right to parole to have a liberty interest in parole procedures that the 14th Amendment's Due Process clause will guarantee?
Do Nebraska's current parole procedures still meet the requirements of the 14th Amendment's Due Process clause under the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and used by the Greenholtz Court?