When a statute makes it a crime to travel in commerce or across state lines with an improper purpose or intent, can the government manufacture federal jurisdiction over local criminal activity by splitting a round trip taken for a wholly innocent purpose into two parts as to permit an inference that travel home was for an illegal purpose (as the Ninth Circuit held), or is that prohibited by Mortensen (as other circuits have held)?

2. When a statute criminalizes travel in commerce or across state lines with an improper purpose or intent, must that be the "dominant motive" of the travel (as Mortensen required), or is it enough that it was "a motivating purpose" (as the Ninth Circuit held)?

When a statute makes it a crime to travel in commerce or across state lines with an improper purpose or intent, can the government manufacture federal jurisdiction over local criminal activity by splitting a round trip taken for a wholly innocent purpose into two parts as to permit an inference that travel home was for an illegal purpose (as the Ninth Circuit held), or is that prohibited by Mortensen (as other circuits have held)?