1. Whether, when instructing a jury on causation in a federal employee Title VII claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) it is error to fail to instruct the jury on the causation standard delineated in Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 402-411 (2020), but rather to instruct them based on the simple and traditional but-for causation standard in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) which was expressly rejected in Babb.

2. Whether in a federal employee retaliation claim it is error to: use the simple and traditional but-for causation standard to admit evidence of plaintiff's protected whistleblowing and union activity, at least without limiting instructions and to exclude corroborative evidence under F.R.E. 404(b) and 801(d)(2)(D) which tended to prove differential treatment was based on consideration of the Petitioner's EEO activity and identity and absence of mistake.

Subsidiary questions are whether the language and syntax of Title VII should be interpreted as it was under the ADEA, and whether such language bans retaliation in federal employment.

Whether the jury should be instructed on the causation standard delineated in Babb v. Wilkie for federal employee Title VII claims