I. whether the district court violated Kartan's Might to testify and the subsequent prosecitor's comments, "These defendants don't like answering questions. you know that from.. your observations,"after Kartan testified for more than a day and was ccerced to withdraw his testimony by conceding in front of the jury that karton is refusing to answer questions, is not naturally and necessarily commenting on Kartan's silence. The court below erred in conflict wilth this Count's opinion in Rock v. Arkansas. 483 U.S-44 (1987) and Griffin V. California, 380 U-S.609 (1965).

II. Whelther the mechanistic exclusion of exculpatory eridence of Sting calls admittance of hearsay testimony of a non-testifjing nanng, in combination, deprived Barei and Kartan a fair trial in conflict with this Cout's opinion in Chambers v. Mississippi, 93 S.ct.1038 (1973).

III. whetther the four disjunctively structured subsections of the forced labor statute, 18 U.s.c $ 1589la), are clements or means. Withont fully considering the breadtn of the statute, different mens rea requirements, different degrees of culpability (riotent and nonviotent nature, commercial and domestic source) different proof and conduct requirements, the case law explicitly referring he individual subsections as element' and the case law referring a particular subsection(s) to the exclusion of others, the court below erred, on this issue of first impression, in concluding that the alternatives are means, in conflict with Cownt's 6pinion in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.5.518 (2016).

IV. whalter an emplogee, Thapa, a Us resident with a working call phone and with Friends and family an hour away, who works for an employer (kartan) for 2 lays and claims that during her egress, the emploger repeatedly asked her to get out but also claims that empleger streatened to call the police, can daim half an hour of forced labor.

V. Whether an employer can violate forced labor statete if the free wi of the below crred, wiltout this cout's guidance for more lhan lhree decades, since involuntary. Consistent with this Court's concern in Kozmineki about the arbitrary intenpretation of psychological coercion, varicus cowrts are conflicted in their nterpretation and approach with the forced labor statute, federalizing local mployee-employer squabbles into forced labor violations.

VI. whetther the court below erred in presuming the grossly excessive 16-year sentence each, impesed on Barai and Kartan, exceeding the sentence severity and duration (here the total duration of labor is 44 dayshapa worked for 2 days and Thamma for 42 days and they walked out voluntaridy), as procedurally and substantively reasonable, in conflict wilh this Court's opinion in Gall v. United States, 552 U.s.38 (2oo7) and Rita v. united states, 551 U.s-338 (20o7), even though the facts of this case most favorable to the Government do net come close to resemble the mildest foam of forced laber.

Whether the district court violated Kastan's right to testify and the subsequent prosecutor's comments, 'The defendants don't like answering questions,' of the Kastan testified for more than a day and was compelled to withdraw his testimony by conceding in front of the jury that 'Kastan was refusing to answer questions,' in violation of the Court's opinion in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)