This Court has held that, where Congress makes the application of federal law turn on a prior "conviction" that, "by its nature," "involves" certain "conduct," a categorical approach governs. Federal law conditions the requirement to register as a sex offender on "convict[ion]" of a "sex offense," and it defines "sex offense" (as relevant here) as an "offense against a minor that involves .. . [a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor." 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(1), (5)(A)(ii), (6)(C), (7). The Seventh Circuit concluded that a circumstance-specific analysis governs whether a prior conviction is a federal "sex offense."

The questions presented are:

1. Did the Seventh Circuit err in holding that a circumstance-specific approach applies to 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii), (5)(C), (7)()?

2. If a categorical approach applies, then is Thomas Thayer's prior conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.345(1)(b) a "sex offense"?

Whether a categorical approach applies to determining if a prior conviction is a federal 'sex offense'