1. Where 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a double-barreled crime that, at least in the
context of aiding and abetting, requires proof both of a defendant's active
participation and his prior knowledge that someone would use a firearm
during the commission of the predicate offense, does Pinkerton liability,
which requires neither active participation nor prior knowledge, have any
role to play in securing the heightened penalties under § 924(c)(3)(A), which
looks at whether the defendant elected to use force knowing the harm his
conduct would cause another?

2. Where in Taylor and Borden this Court looked to a defendant's election to use
force against another, as opposed to simply engaging in conduct that creates
a risk that force would be deployed against another, when the government
elects to secure a conviction on the basis of aiding and abetting liability for
what would otherwise be a predicate offense, can the government use the
defendant's conviction as the basis for securing the enhanced penalties under
§ 924(c)(3)(A)?

3. Where a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery can be secured on the basis of
placing someone in fear of injury to property, has an individual convicted of
Hobbs Act robbery necessarily used, attempted to use or threatened to use
violent physical force as required to qualify as a predicate under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A)?

Where 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires proof of active participation and prior knowledge for aiding and abetting, does Pinkerton liability have a role in securing heightened penalties under § 924(c)(3)(A)