Rimma Kunik v. New York City Department of Education, et al.
1. Quotes in the Order (p.6'4-7; p.9-8-13)issued by the Court of Appeal on 5/13/2021
such as "Kunik did not allege any overt discrimination (emphasis added) based on
her age or religion, much less any facts showing that 'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult ' were 'sufficiently severe or pervasive ' to alter the conditions of
her employment... " echo other similar argumentation in the presented case.
Is presence of defendants ' recorded slurs directed at plaintiffs indispensable for a
case to be accepted/defined as discriminatory or is the ample evidence of numerous
factually supported discriminatory actions, inexplicably disregarded by courts,
against plaintiffs that "speak louder than words " sufficient and must be accepted as
the undeniable sufficient proof of such discrimination as the above "silence of the
lambs " cannot cancel the defendants ' discriminatory actions?
2. When required to evaluate the workload of a plaintiff in a discrimination case,
courts find it difficult to pronounce a correct determination and often refer to the
fact that they lack "the bright line rule " for it. Does this Court agree that comparing
• the time the plaintiff used to spend on earning his paycheck before the
unwanted changes were introduced into his/her employment history
• to the time spent on his/her new assignment, allegedly based on
discriminatory intent or direct discrimination,
will allow to determine, correctly and easily, if the new assignment is truly
'burdensome " and thus discriminatory?
Whether the presence of defendants' recorded slurs is indispensable for a discrimination case or if ample evidence of discriminatory actions is sufficient proof