1. Whether, in accordance with this Court's directive that the standard for the second prong of a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas v. Greens burden-shifting analysis is the plaintiff's objective qualification, or instead the standard created by the Eighth Circuit that requires the employer's "legitimate expectations"?

2. Whether this Court's instruction in Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009) that an employee who communicated to his or her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in a form of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII, virtually always constitutes protected activity, or instead, employer's conduct must be illegal for employee to engage in protected activity?

3. Whether under Title VII, unsubstantiated accusations of incompetency, harassment, alienating, ridiculing employee, punishing employee without investigation, coercing an employee to use a name preferred by an employer, and employer's plan to intimidate an employee who engaged in protected activity that interfered with the employee's work condition and work-relationship constitute hostile work-environment?

4. Whether an employer who failed to investigate discrimination complaint violates Title VII?

5. Whether a trial court has discretion to not adjudicate claims before it that it has jurisdiction over?

Whether the standard for the second prong of a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas v. Green's burden-shifting analysis is the plaintiff's objective qualification or the employer's 'legitimate expectations'