During the liquidity crisis of 2008-09, the United States determined the public interest required Chrysler and General Motors because they were too important to fail. Believing each would be more profitable with fewer dealers, the Government restructuring plans required the confiscation of large numbers of General Motors and Chrysler dealer franchises. branded vehicles, parts, and service in exclusive territories were terminated and gifted to other dealers who the Government assumed would operate more productively, thereby benefitting the public. Believing state laws prohibited those dealership terminations without compensation, the Government executed a bankruptcy strategy to circumvent paying for the dealerships being taken while concomitantly blocking dealers from purchasing each other in the free market. The Court of Federal compensated property seizure on two grounds: that the Chrysler less because their franchise contracts would have been rejected in bankruptcy if the Government had not intervened during the liquidity crisis and that the Government was not legally responsible for the actions of Chrysler. The Federal Circuit affirmed the former and declined to address the latter.

THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE:

1. Whether the novel Federal defense to takings liability conflicts with , 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (categorical defenses are barred in takings cases), , 576 U.S. 351 (2015)(hypothetical analysis is not permitted to bar takings liability), , 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (balancing factors are required in regulatory takings cases), and , 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (regulatory takings requirements may not be imported into direct takings cases), as reiterated in , 210 L.Ed.2d 369 (2021)?

2. Whether the dismissal of the direct takings claims that were not even defended by the Government on a ground it never raised departs so far from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that the exercise visory power is justified because it contradicts the controlling precedents of - 140 S.Ct. 1575 (2020) (party presentation rule), , 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (entitlement to be heard before a court rules upon defenses it injected for the Government), and , 137 S.Ct. 1933 (2017) (fairness is required in takings cases)?

3. Whether the affirmance of the economic valuation decisions conflicts with the holding of , 139 S.Ct. 1652 (2019) (franchisee rights are not rendered worthless by rejection in bankruptcy) and , 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (proof of fair market value is not required in cases of economic emergency)?

Whether the novel Federal Circuit 'but for' defense to takings liability conflicts with precedents