An essential element of generic "burglary" is that the person formed the specific intent to commit a crime at some point during the commission of the offense. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990); Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019). Tennessee, like a small handful of other states, has expanded its definition of burglary to omit the element of specific intent. Under this expanded definition, a person may be convicted of burglary when he or she trespasses in a building with no intent to commit a crime and, while there, commits a reckless or negligent crime, never having formed the specific intent to commit a crime at any time. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(3).

Is a burglary statute that omits the element of specific intent a generic "burglary" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)?

Whether a burglary statute that omits the element of specific intent qualifies as generic 'burglary' for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act