i.
May a bankruptcy court apply the Barton Doctrine to its own proceedings and exponentially
expand its authority under Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) to include, without limitation,
the power, authority and jurisdiction to:
1. curtail, disrupt, or otherwise limit the jurisdiction of a state court to review, reverse, or
modify its own state-court orders and judgments;
2. treat the Barton Doctrine as a procedural bar to suits against a U.S. trustee, his counsel, his
co-defendants, and any defendant it wishes to shield from liability;
3. exercise special authority or jurisdiction over, and prohibit suit against, defendants who
are not and were never "court-appointed " fiduciaries of any court;
4. prohibit suits against a U.S. trustee, his counsel, and his co-defendants in their individual
capacities for ultra vires acts clearly exceeding the scope of a trustee's duties and/or for
engaging in tortious and criminal misconduct during a 9-month to 3-year period prior to
the operation of a bankruptcy case and before there was any estate to administer;
5. fashion "Barton injunctions " where no requisite for the issuance of a permanent injunction
is satisfied and no evidence suggests an enjoined action would "impede, impair, or
irreparably interfere with " the administration of a bankruptcy estate;
6. prohibit all courts of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating "non-core " claims over
which bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction, and/or "core-proceedings " in which a jury-trial
is demanded, from being raised in a court of competent jurisdiction;
7. adjudicate "non-core" claims over which it lacks jurisdiction by dismissing them with
prejudice and/or prohibit "core-proceedings " from being brought in the bankruptcy court;
and
8. prohibit secured creditors from pursuing timely filed claims in a bankruptcy case?

2.
Are violations of 11 U.S.C. §362(a) void ab initio or are they merely "voidable " transgressions
capable of "retroactive validation?" If inadvertent violations are merely "voidable,"
(1) Are intentional actions in knowing and willful violation of 11 U.S.C. §362(a) also capable of
"retroactive rehabilitation " and/or other discretionary cures?
(2) If so, is the result the same where third-parties, with no standing or interest in a Chapter 7
case, commit these acts for the express purpose of defrauding creditors? And,
(3) What effect does "retroactive rehabilitation " have on 11 U.S.C. §362(k)? Are individuals
injured by "retroactively rehabilitated " violations still entitled to recover actual and
punitive damages? If not, what remedies or remedial measures are substituted for those
available under 11 U.S.C. §362(k)?

May a bankruptcy court exponentially expand the Barton Doctrine?