John L. Howell v. David Adler, et al.
To deny a plaintiff's constitutional right to due process and prohibit suit against a particular set of defendants who it wishes to shield from liability, may the lower court:
a) confer Art. Ill powers of United States courts on an Art. I court of limited jurisdiction;
b) sanction "Barton injunctions" that prohibit plaintiffs from bringing "non-core " claims (including pendant state claims) in courts of competent jurisdiction and prohibit state courts from reviewing their own state-court interlocutory orders or entering any judgments related to those orders;
c) refuse to proceed on the assumption that factual allegations in a complaint are true;
d) extend quasi- judicial immunity to defendants who are not "government officials " nor agents of "government officials " entitled to "derivative " immunity;
e) extend "retroactive" "derivative" quasi-judicial immunity to defendants who, after engaging in a pattern of tortious and criminal misconduct for 3 years, were subsequently employed by their Co-Defendant/U.S. trustee so that, as "court- appointed " officers, they could assert his affirmative defense of qualified immunity;
f) hold that qualified immunity shields defendants from liability for blatant violations of clearly established law; and
g) refuse plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaints before subjecting them to prejudicial (and sua sponte ) dismissal?
To deny a plaintiff's constitutional right to due process and prohibit suit against a particular set of defendants who it wishes to shield from liability, may the lower court: a) confer Art. III powers of United States courts on an Art. I court of limited jurisdiction; b) sanction 'Barton injunctions' that prohibit plaintiffs from bringing 'non-core' claims (including pendant state claims) in courts of competent jurisdiction and prohibit state courts from reviewing their own state-court interlocutory orders or , entering any judgments related to those orders; c) refuse to proceed on the assumption that factual allegations in a complaint are true; d) extend quasi-judicial immunity to defendants who are not 'government officials' nor agents of 'government officials' entitled to 'derivative' immunity; e) extend 'retroactive' 'derivative' quasi-judicial immunity to defendants who, after engaging in a pattern of tortious and criminal misconduct for 3 years, were . subsequently employed by their Co-Defendant/U.S. trustee so that, as 'courtappointed' officers, they could assert his affirmative defense of qualified immunity; f) hold that qualified immunity shields defendants from liability for blatant violations of clearly established law; and g) refuse plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaints before subjecting them to prejudicial (and sua sponte) dismissal?