In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979), this Court held "(t]he Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," citing In re Winship; In United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment "require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt"; In Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), this Court requires charging documents to contain the essential elements that constitute the crime charged; In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), this Court prohibited jury instructions that relieves the Government of its burden of proof enunciated in In re Winship. The question presented is:

1. Are the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments violated where in a case tried and presented under the transferred intent theory the jury is not instructed cxi the State's burden of proof regarding the requisite facts against alleged intended victim but is directed and guided to decide immaterial issues, i.e the accused's alleged specific intent and malice against the bystanders instead, where the jury is provided an evidentiary presumption that has no constitutional underpinnings in the case, where the accused's convictions is upheld upon contradictory theories, i.e permissible and impermissible theory?

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000), this Court left unanswered the meaning of "constitutional ," that have led to differing interpretations among the circuits. The circuits remain split on this issue. The question presented is:

2. Does the substituted word "constitutional" requires a more stringent standard than the former certificate for probable cause? Does petitioner's claims: the various jury instructions challenges, the evidence sufficiency challenge, the charging documents challenge merits a OQA?

Are the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments violated where in a case tried and presented under the transferred intent theory the jury is not instructed on the State's burden of proof regarding the requisite facts against alleged intended victim but is directed and guided to decide immaterial issues, i.e., the accused's alleged specific intent and malice against the bystanders instead, where the jury is provided an evidentiary presumption that has no constitutional underpinnings in the case, where the accused's convictions is upheld upon contradictory theories, i.e., a legally permissible and impermissible theory?