1. Was Petitioner James Rice denied the right to a speedy trial in the state courts? The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]" The Supreme Court of the United States set forth the requirements that constitute a speedy trial in their landmark case Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The argument that was presented to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is contained in pages 2-22.

2. Did the federal courts err in finding that the judgment of the state courts was not an unreasonable application of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)? A state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if he can demonstrate that "the state court's adjudication of the prisoner's constitutional claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United State.s[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

3. Did the federal courts err in barring consideration of the fourth factor of Barker v. Wingo (i.e., prejudice to the Petitioner by the unjustifiable delay between accusation and prosecution) because counsel did not assert the fourth factor in the habeas petition, and instead asserted it in the traverse? The Magistrate's Report and Recommendation in the district court specifically barred consideration of the fourth factor of Barker v. Wingo because counsel listed it in the traverse and not the habeas petition. Counsel did properly object, but the district court judge and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Magistrate's recommendation, citing Sixth Circuit case law only. The decision effectively foreclosed the Petitioner from relief on the speedy trial claim, and is unreasonable given that the fourth factor was argued at all required stages of the state court proceedings, and was, after all, presented in the traverse where reasonable under the particular circumstances of the instant case.

4. Was Petitioner James Rice entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his federal habeas petition, where the Ohio Public Defender's Office volunteered to represent the Petitioner in federal court, and the habeas petition was arguably denied because counsel failed to assert the fourth factor of Barker v. Wingo (i.e., prejudice) until the traverse, and thus the federal courts barred consideration of the fourth factor? It is well established that ineffective assistance of counsel, whether at trial or in a direct appeal, must be attributed to the State and not the federal habeas petitioner. See Coleman v. Thompson v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Ineffective assistance of counsel is established through a two pronged analysis, "[fjirst, the [petitioner] must show that counsel's performance was deficient ... [and] [s]econd, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Had counsel included the fourth factor in the petition, all four factors would have been considered, and the Petitioner would have received habeas corpus relief.

Was Petitioner James Rice denied the right to a speedy trial?