Does one sovereign - specifically the federal government - lose or surrender its primary jurisdiction when they release an inmate who is serving their consecutive sentence into the physical custody of another sovereign, not on loan for prosecution but to serve the other sovereign's judgment against him?

Under the Sixth circuit precedent, "[t]he surrender to another state while the prisoner is serving a sentence is equivalent to a pardon." In such a case the judgment of conviction is satisfied and there is no continuing jurisdiction. Isbell was serving a consecutive federal sentence when he was surrendered to Illinois for service of Illinois' sentence. In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that despite the surrender of Isbell, "the federal government did not relinquish ... jurisdiction [of him] when he was released into the custody of Illinois." Did the Sixth Circuit err in not following their own precedent?

Under the Sixth Circuit's precedent in Stroble, when a prisoner is loaned to a state under the IAD, and that state prosecutes the prisoner, then, through an administrative mistake, commences that prisoner's sentence and imprisons him in their state without returning him, then, after discovering the error, returns him, it was held that such an administrative mistake could not result in the loss of that sovereign's primary jurisdiction because he was merely on loan under the IAD, and primary jurisdiction rested with the United States, who then surrendered him to Illinois for service of his state sentence. Did the lower courts err when they applied Stroble's reasoning to Isbell's case?

Under federal law, unless a federal court specifically orders a federal criminal sentence to run concurrently to another sentence, "Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times are to be served consecutively." Isbell's federal judge did not order Isbell's sentence to run concurrent to his already-imposed state court sentence. Did the Bureau of Prisons err in holding that Isbell's federal sentence was concurrent, and abuse its discretion by granting a nunc pro tunc after first denying it?

Did the Sixth Circuit err in its holding that the United States did not relinquish primary jurisdiction over Isbell when it transferred him without writ to Illinois to serve his Illinois sentence, or is the Ninth Circuit correct in its intent analysis?

Does one sovereign lose or surrender its primary jurisdiction when it releases an inmate serving a consecutive sentence into the custody of another sovereign?