Can Criminal Liability for a charged offense be based upon the Defendant's complicity in an offense which is clearly distinct from any charged offense, and which is not in any way alleged in the Indictment? Bar of trial by judgment, or does it violate the Notice Clause of the 6th Amendment, the Grand Jury Clause of the 5th Amendment, or the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments?

This case is about whether or not it would be unconstitutional to instruct the jury at Person A's trial in a manner which could allow them to find him/her liable for the actions of Person B, so long as they had agreed to commit a drug offense together, and Person B's actions furthered that objective. The question presented here also addresses whether or not it would be unconstitutional for an appellate court to decide that Person A is guilty to commit a drug offense provided legally sufficient evidence to hold him/her liable for Person B's actions. However, that's not what happened in my case, in which the challenge was only instructions.

Whether a theory of criminal liability based on complicity in an uncharged crime is constitutional