Whether district court's lack of religious neutrality violated Petitioner's right to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment or Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The district court's decision in this case which religious hostility on part of the court itself is factor, violates the federal court's obligation of religious neutrality under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution.

An impartial review of the final judgment in the instant case reveals that the district court exhibited hostility toward The district court defined his Petitioner's religious views, religious views as "subjective belief", questioned the validity of the Baha'i Teachings and inquired whether Petitioner's inter pretation of his religious teachings is correct, the district judge acted as an "arbiter of scriptural interpreta-In other words, tion," which according to this Honorable Court, "it is not within [his] judicial function and judicial competence" to do so.

Thomas v. Review Board., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1431 (1 981 ).

In Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), this Honorable Court reversed the ruling on two grounds: (1) hostility towards Phillips' religious beliefs made by the Commission; and (2) significant differences between prior Commission exemptions and the instant case.

Similarly, in the case at hand, the district court's hos tility towards Petitioner's religious views, and significant differences between prior exemptions accorded to adherents of other religions by the federal courts, and the court's refusal to extend the same constitutional protections to Petitioner warrants reversal of judgment.

2. Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act defines "Free Exercise of religion [asj act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by sincere religious beliefs." TRFRA also provides for religious exemptions from conduct that violates sincerely held Petitioner applied for such exemptions on religious beliefs. religious grounds and would have received one, but for the fact that the State and the federal courts disfavored his religion because of the religious condemnation of slavery it commands; he was denied a narrow exemption.

The question presented is, whether the government, in pursuit of legitimate interest, can in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious beliefs? Dr whether the government can regulate or outlaw conduct because it is religiously motivated .113 S. Ct. 2217.

3. In response to Petitioner's Plea for a religious exemption from participating in Prison Work Program without pay, because slavery is contrary to the Law of God in his religion. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that because the prison system required prisoners to work, then Petitioner has no viable 13th Amendment claim.

In other words, the Fifth Circuit declared that the provision of the 13th Amendment overrides the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, authorized the lower courts to ignore prisoner's First Amendment claims in favor of slavery, affirmed discrimination against religious beliefs, and sanctioned Texas to impose a penalty on Free Exercise of Religion.

In light of this Honorable Court's precedent that, "a law may not discriminate against some or all religious beliefs." 113 S. Ct. 2217, the question presented is whether the application of State regulation 497.099 requiring prisoners to work for no pay, discriminates against Petitioner's religious beliefs, or violates his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution.

4. Title 28 U . S.C.A. §191 5(e) and §191 5A

Whether district court's lack of religious neutrality violated Petitioner's right to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment or Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment