This case presents clear and intractable conflicts
regarding: 1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the
limitations it imposes on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts; 2) Hawaii's sovereign right to enforce its
criminal laws; and 3) the appellate deference that the
Court has historically accorded to a trial court's mistrial declaration.

The first question presented is: Did the Ninth
Circuit err in concluding - in direct conflict with the
Court's holding in Exxon - that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is categorically not applicable to § 2241 petitions including those in which state-court losers invite
district court review and rejection of allegedly injurious state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and pursuant to which
the state-court losers are not in custody?

The second question presented is: Did the Ninth
Circuit err in concluding - in direct conflict with the
Court's holding in Washington - that the trial court's
mistrial declaration was not supported by manifest necessity based on the result of its mechanical application of the three-step formula of its own creation that
is virtually identical to the three-factor formula that
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010), made clear is
not "a constitutional test that determine[s] whether a
trial judge has exercised sound discretion in declaring
a mistrial?"

Did the Ninth Circuit err in concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is categorically not applicable to § 2241 petitions?