I. Does Due Process require that a waiver of a state constitutionally protected right to a jury trial must be perfected knowingly and voluntarily with full understanding and awareness of the direct consequences and impact of the waiver?

II. If so, is any lack of full understanding of the direct consequences a jurisdictional matter?

III. Are North Carolina's §§ 15A-642(e) and 15A-643(e) procedural waiver statutes, absent in-court inquiry into the direct consequences, unconstitutionally vague and undue such that the waiver of a court trial's benefits is presumed from a silent record contrary to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) and contrary to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?

IV. Does Due Process of law and fundamental fairness of the Fourteenth Amendment require that the factual basis for plea, upon validity of the plea, be established by competent evidence and not by some prosecutorial fiction merely to satisfy the elements of some offense agreed to under the plea?

V. Even under Strickland's highly deferential standard(s), does defense counsel's performance reasonably under prevailing professional norms by counsel's absolute refusal, despite numerous requests that he do so to the point of creating an irreconcilable impasse over the tactical issue, to file a pretrial suppression motion based upon an egregiously flagrant violation of Miranda v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 43, 474 (where mere 18/OAS a reasonable probability of success, wherein untried counsel went to extraordinary lengths to coerce a plea based solely on that same illegally obtained evidence, sought to be suppressed, no for which counsel received a fee of $87?

VI. Does it violate Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law under the Fourteenth Amendment for a cherry or resistant cherry of court to knowingly and deliberately deny a defendant extra of proceedings, simply by withholding the contact information of a court reporter able to transcribe the verbatim records necessary for an adequate resolution of a post-conviction, jurisdictionally significant change?

VII. If so, was it a fundamental error for the N.C. Court of Appeals in File Number P17-575 for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to perform a duty required by law to deny a hearing on that writ? And lastly, for the N.C. Supreme Court to deny a discretionary review of that obvious error thus perpetuating the arbitrary denial of the transcribed record to the defendant's prejudice for a post-conviction review and resolution of a jurisdictionally significant change?

Whether the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated