Pursuant to the intervening Constitutional rule announced in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US ; 136 S Ct 718 (2016), which clarified the retroactivity jurisprudence of Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), should the United States Supreme Court's extension of Apprendi V New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000) -- that was clarified for the first time in Aileyne v United States, 570 US 99 (2013) -- have been applied retroactively to Petitioner's case, since the Apprendi-Alleyne constitutional rule invokes substantive as well procedural Sixth Amendment protection against increases in "either end" of the sentencing range, based on facts that were not admitted to by the defendant, or found by a jury "beyond a reasonable doubt"?

Does this Court have jurisdiction to decide whether the appellate courts for the State of Michigan correctly refused to give retroactive effect in this matter to the United States Supreme Court's substantive rule of constitutional law set forth in Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000), as extended and clarified for the first time in Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99 (2013), in wake of the intervening clarification of Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), retroactivity jurisprudence that was interpreted and clarified by the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 136 S Ct 718 (2016), which has been, and is still being, misinterpreted by the State of Michigan and other federal habeas circuits?

Whether the Apprendi-Alleyne rule should be applied retroactively