This case is a Non-Mixed Motive and Non-Pretext Title VII employment discrimination suit. The exclusive focus in this case is the sort of showing a Title VII employer-defendant must make to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in order to avoid an entry of judgment as a matter of law in plaintiffs favor. For nearly 46 years, the opinion of this Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases.—under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, "[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Burdine, supra, at 254—The McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case--i.e., the burden of "producing evidence" that the adverse employment actions were taken "for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Burdine, 450 U.S., at 254. Here in this particular case, the District Court found that Respondents failed to rebut the presumption set forth in the Petitioner's prima facie case and she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nevertheless, the District Court did not enter judgment for Petitioner and instead took her case to an illegal jury trial and dismissed the case.

1. Whether, in a non-pretext, non-mixed motive suit against an employer alleging intentional racial discrimination in violation of § 703 (a)(1)(2) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the trier of fact's determination that the employer is silent and failed to carry its burden of production to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case of unlawful discrimination under the allocation of proof established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), mandates a finding for the plaintiff?

Whether, in a non-pretext, non-mixed motive suit against an employer alleging intentional age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1)(2), upon establishing a rebuttable 'presumption' of unlawful discrimination, the trier of fact's determination that the employer is silent and failed to carry its burden of production under the allocation of proof established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), mandates a finding for the plaintiff?

Whether, in a suit against an employer alleging employer unlawfully demoted plaintiff in violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA of 1967 as amended, the trier of fact determined employer is silent and failed to legally argue or refute a claim at summary judgment, mandates a finding for plaintiff?

Determining whether employer's failure to rebut prima facie case of discrimination mandates judgment for plaintiff