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International Medical Devices, Inc. v. Cornell

Oral Argument — 03/05/2026 · Case 25-1843 · 10:17

Appeal Number
25-1843
Argument Date
03/05/2026
Duration
10:17
Segments
200
Panel Judges
  • Judge Judge Dyk high
  • Judge Judge Taranto high
Attorneys
  • Appellant Appellant Attorney high
  • Appellee Appellee Attorney high
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0:00 Judge Dyk Case this morning, number 25, 1843, International Medical Devices v. Cornell.
0:05 Again, Mr. Puff.
0:07 Appellant Attorney Thank you, Your Honor.
0:08 The Court has been very generous with its time, and I appreciate your attention,
0:12 and so I'm going to be concise on this issue.
0:16 Obviously, this appeal is the challenge to the cost award that follows from the underlying judgment.
0:22 With respect to the cost, I want to make the point that I think the law is uniform,
0:27 that in order to be a prevailing party for purposes of cost,
0:30 a party must secure some relief on the merits that materially alters the legal relationship of the parties.
0:36 If the Court reverses the judgment against the defendants, and in this instance,
0:41 particularly against my client, Richard Finger,
0:43 then there is no material alteration that would support an award of cost.
0:47 I want to acknowledge that when we prepared the brief,
0:51 I was relying on cases like future link from this Court that say
0:55 the question of prevailing party status,
0:57 under Rule 54, is a matter of federal circuit precedent.
1:01 In preparing for the argument that occurred to me,
1:03 you might question whether that should be a matter of regional circuit precedent,
1:07 and to the extent that you have that question, there's no difference.
1:10 And I'd call your attention to Miles v. the State of California,
1:14 which is that 320 Fed Third, 986, a Ninth Circuit decision
1:19 that establishes that same material alteration standard.
1:22 And so the clash that arises in the briefing here is,
1:27 one in which the plaintiffs suggest that if the judgment remains intact
1:32 with respect to any defendant as to any claim,
1:36 their prevailing parties, then they're entitled to all their costs.
1:38 That's not correct.
1:39 We cited the controlling authorities that established
1:43 if the underlying judgment is reversed,
1:45 the cost order must be reversed and sent back to the district court.
1:49 The reason is that they may ultimately be prevailing parties as to some defendants,
1:53 and then the district court could tax the appropriate costs as to those defendants.
1:57 But with respect to my client, Richard Finger, let me be clear.
2:01 The fact that they may have a judgment at the end of the day against the other defendants
2:05 does not matter to my client.
2:07 He was sued individually, he was found liable individually,
2:10 and if he prevails on his claims against individual liability,
2:14 the plaintiffs are not prevailing parties as to him,
2:16 and they are not entitled to costs as to him.
2:19 Unless the court has questions, I'll yield the rest of my time.
2:22 Judge Dyk Okay. Thank you. Mr. Manning.
2:27 Appellee Attorney Thank you, Judge Dyke.
2:29 And I'll endeavor to be...
2:30 ...similarly briefed on the cost issue.
2:34 So there's two issues here, the cost issue,
2:36 and then we have the cross-appeal regarding fees,
2:37 just to deal with costs first.
2:40 As this court has said in Schum versus Intel,
2:44 there's only one prevailing party.
2:47 Parts of the judgment that have not been appealed
2:49 relate to breach of contract, relate to copyright infringement,
2:54 will remain the prevailing party regardless in that case.
2:59 And so the district court's cost award should be affirmed.
3:05 Judge Taranto Just, I guess, if there's only going to be one prevailing party,
3:14 why wouldn't we, if we disturb anything here in the judgment in front of us,
3:22 maybe put aside something, anything significant, okay,
3:27 why wouldn't we send it back to the district court to reassess,
3:33 whether, who is the prevailing party?
3:37 Appellee Attorney Your Honor, I think that the reason is that there's no counterclaim.
3:40 So there's nothing going back that's going to, you know, affect.
3:44 I mean, if we don't prevail on our claims,
3:46 that just means we haven't prevailed on all the claims.
3:48 But we have prevailed on some claims that aren't appealed.
3:51 And so, like, there's nothing in the posture of this case
3:54 that, you know, whatever the court does...
3:57 Judge Taranto I guess I'm just trying to understand.
3:58 If there's only one prevailing party in a case...
4:01 Right.
4:02 Even for the cost provision, let alone other fee,
4:06 attorney's fees provisions,
4:09 then the trial court has to look at who won how much and who lost how much.
4:16 And if that shifts, isn't the new determination required?
4:20 Appellee Attorney I don't believe so, Your Honor, because I think,
4:23 going from memory here, but I think the Love and Care case
4:25 that came out, this court had a couple years ago,
4:27 talked about how it remanded for certain things to be,
4:31 I believe it was an aquaconduct that got remanded.
4:34 But the question was, as far as prevailing party status goes,
4:37 the claims that were being affirmed,
4:39 or in this case, the claims that haven't been challenged,
4:41 will still remain.
4:42 And so, my recollection is the court affirmed the cost award there
4:45 because nothing's going to change the fact that IMD brought claims,
4:49 IMD has prevailed on those claims,
4:51 and therefore it's the prevailing party.
4:53 Judge Dyk Okay, but there's this netting out concept.
4:55 I'm not sure that the briefs address that,
4:57 but there is authority that we're...
5:00 or one party prevails on some claims,
5:02 another party prevails on another set of claims
5:05 as a kind of a netting out concept with respect to the cost.
5:08 I don't mean to get into that,
5:10 but I'm not sure that the law that says
5:16 there's only one prevailing party
5:17 bars that kind of netting out concept.
5:20 Appellee Attorney I'm not going to fight too hard on this court saying
5:23 if it needs a sentence and costs back.
5:25 I mean, I think on the netting out point,
5:26 the one thing I would note, though, is I can't tell you
5:30 if all those cases, but certainly it matters
5:32 if there are counterclaims being addressed, too.
5:34 So, I mean, the netting out may be one party wins on its claims
5:37 and the other party wins on its claims,
5:39 and then you have to figure this out.
5:40 There are no counterclaims that are issued here.
5:42 It's only our claims, and we don't have to prevail
5:44 on all of our claims in order to be the prevailing party.
5:48 Just one brief word on the attorney's fees issues.
5:51 We note in our brief we think the court focusing on
5:55 attorney's fees being duplicative of exemplary damages
5:57 was just the wrong standard because attorney's fees,
6:00 certainly, are not duplicative of exemplary damages.
6:00 They serve a different purpose than exemplary damages.
6:03 In essence, the court was treating them
6:05 as another form of exemplary damages,
6:07 as the Tenth Circuit case, Clear One Communications case,
6:11 I think makes clear.
6:12 Attorney's fees in the trade secret context
6:14 serve a different purpose.
6:16 They're not a form of exemplary damages.
6:18 Judge Dyk Yeah, but the judge also said there was no bad faith there, right?
6:22 Appellee Attorney Yes, but bad faith is under the attorney's fee statute.
6:25 That's a separate ground for attorney's fees.
6:29 It's a separate ground for attorney's fees.
6:30 If a claim was brought in bad faith
6:33 or if there was willful and malicious misappropriation,
6:36 the court can award attorney's fees.
6:37 So focusing on the bad faith only focused on part of the statute
6:41 that goes to looking at whether the claim was brought
6:44 or resisted in bad faith.
6:46 Willful misappropriation is a separate ground.
6:49 At the very least, if the court decides to disturb,
6:52 which we urge the court not to,
6:54 but if the court decides to disturb the exemplary damages finding,
6:59 then that's a separate ground.
7:00 At the very least, we should go back
7:01 because that was the basis for the district court's order,
7:04 and so it's now changed the basis for her to deny fees to begin with.
7:09 Let's go to the other questions.
7:10 I thank you, Your Honor, for your time.
7:11 Judge Dyk Thank you, Mr. Post.
7:12 Anything further?
7:17 Appellant Attorney Thank you, Your Honor.
7:18 I will not address the cost issue further.
7:20 I will speak to the cross-appeal on the attorney's fees.
7:22 The first point that I want to make is that in the main appeal,
7:26 I made the point that there is certainly no evidence of malicious conduct
7:31 by my client.
7:32 That would be a predicate to an award of attorney's fees
7:36 as much as it's a predicate to an award of exemplary damages.
7:39 That's an independent basis on which you could not reverse on this issue.
7:43 The second point I would make, Judge Taranto,
7:45 I wanted to speak to the question.
7:47 Judge Taranto Sorry, just so I'm clear.
7:48 Yes.
7:49 You're saying that maliciousness is a necessary requirement?
7:53 It is.
7:54 Appellant Attorney It is, yes.
7:55 And so I would call your attention, Your Honor.
7:57 I pointed to these cases earlier, but the applied medical case
8:02 and the champion systems case from the California Court of Appeals
8:05 says willful and malicious under the California Uniform Traits Act
8:10 is a two-part test.
8:12 Evidence of willful conduct is not enough.
8:14 There must also be evidence of malicious conduct.
8:17 And because there's no evidence here that Mr. Finger did anything malicious,
8:20 they couldn't get fees from him just as they can't get exemplary damages from him.
8:24 That's the first point.
8:25 The second point is I wanted to respond to the question you asked
8:28 about the pretrial order because it's material here as well.
8:32 You questioned whether the pretrial order had actually omitted
8:35 the claim for exemplary damages, and as counsel pointed out,
8:38 it not only omitted the claim for exemplary damages,
8:41 it omitted the issue of willful and malicious prosecution.
8:46 And if you look at the...
8:47 Judge Dyk I'm getting back into the first appeal.
8:49 Appellant Attorney I'm not trying to for this purpose, Your Honor,
8:51 but what I am saying is if you look at the Supreme Court's decision in Rockwell,
8:56 that court accepted the proposition that claims and issues,
9:02 that are omitted from the pretrial order, are out of the case.
9:06 And so the willful and malicious issue was out of the case
9:10 when it was omitted from the pretrial order.
9:12 And therefore, it's out of the case for attorney's fees purposes
9:14 as much as it's out of the case for purposes of exemplary damages.
9:18 And it was not resurrected by a stipulation that referred only to reasonable royalty.
9:22 Third point is that the argument that counsel is making today,
9:27 that the district court erred in some respect by failing to award fees,
9:32 based on the conduct of the litigation,
9:34 is not an argument that was preserved below.
9:37 They committed to the proposition that they could be entitled to attorney's fees
9:42 on the basis of the willful and malicious finding that the court made.
9:46 They're now making a different argument that they did not preserve below.
9:50 And you can see that at pages 10-569 and at pages 11-965 to 66 of the appendix.
9:58 And Judge Dyke, as you pointed out, at page 11 of the appendix,
10:02 the district court found there was no indication that the defendant's litigation was vexatious or in bad faith.
10:07 So there's no basis for any remand on attorney's fees.
10:11 Judge Dyk I appreciate your time.
10:13 I thank both counsel.
10:14 The case is submitted.
10:15 That concludes our session for this morning.