RIDESHARE DISPLAYS, INC. v. LYFT, INC.
Oral Argument — 04/11/2025 · Case 23-2033 · 39:31
0:00
Judge Taranto
First is number 232033, rideshare displays against Lyft.
0:08
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
May it please the Court, RSDI's appeal of the original claims that the PTAB erroneously held unpatentable,
0:16
I want to begin with the PTAB's finding that the Lancet discloses the mobile communication device
0:22
associated with the driver of the vehicle, which is not supported by substantial evidence.
0:26
Now, if this Court agrees, then it should reverse the PTAB's holding of unpatentability
0:31
as to claims 1 of the 525 patent, claim 2 of the 199 patent, and claims 1 through 5 of the 417 patent.
0:41
Each of these claims only had, by the PTAB, a basis of unpatentability based on either the Lancet alone
0:48
or the Lancet with Kemmler, and nobody is alleging that Kemmler discloses this limitation
0:53
because Kemmler is a driverless system.
0:57
So all of the claims require that there is a specific device that is associated with a specific entity,
1:04
and these associations remain constant throughout the system or method that's claimed.
1:09
One requirement is that there is a mobile communication device associated with the driver of the vehicle.
1:14
Now, what the PTAB is relying on for this disclosure in the Lancet is just a minor embodiment
1:22
that's given a total of five lines of disclosure, and what it says is, as part of the dispatch procedure,
1:27
the service provider transmits the dispatch information to a mobile computer in taxi car 118,
1:35
and all the mobile computer then does is, quote, manage the two displays of the Lancet
1:40
by popping that icon up on those two displays.
1:44
And I want to quickly just say that for claim 2 of the 199 patent,
1:48
the PTAB actually provides no basis for finding this limitation met in the Lancet.
1:53
All they do is say we don't agree with...
1:57
patent owners' arguments.
1:59
They run through what they are, say they don't agree,
2:01
and then they say we therefore find that this limitation is disclosed.
2:05
So not only is that not substantial evidence, that's no evidence.
2:10
But with regard to claim 1 of the 525 patent and claims 1 through 5 of the 417 patent,
2:17
what they say in their analysis for these claims is not that the Lancet actually discloses
2:23
the mobile computer being associated with the driver of the vehicle,
2:27
what they say is the mobile computer is in the taxi, so it's associated with the taxi.
2:34
That's right.
2:35
But then they go on to say the driver's in the vehicle, so the driver's associated with the vehicle.
2:41
Judge Taranto
Isn't the term associated fairly capacious with a little bit of a transitive property?
2:48
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Yeah, that's what they're doing.
2:49
They end up doing a transitive property saying...
2:51
Judge Taranto
Why is that wrong with a word like associated?
2:55
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Right.
2:56
So it's wrong because...
2:57
First of all, if we put this in the context of what the Lancet system is,
3:03
if you look at the figure of the Lancet, and that's Appendix 338,
3:09
this is a taxi system, right?
3:11
So what's important in this system is the central server of the taxi.
3:16
That's shown in Figure 1.
3:18
And then the rider and the rider's device, that's shown in Figure 1.
3:24
They're standing and they're holding their cell phone,
3:27
because that's how they...
3:28
order the taxi.
3:30
And then what's important is the vehicle with its two displays.
3:34
And that's what's shown in the Lancet.
3:35
What is not shown anywhere in the Lancet is the driver,
3:39
because the driver isn't important to how this system actually operates.
3:44
And the mobile computer isn't shown at all in Figure 1,
3:48
because it's, again, this blip.
3:49
But it's disclosed like the displays, which are part of the taxi.
3:53
And so it's not a fair reading of the Lancet to say,
3:56
just because we can say,
3:57
hey, the word associate will allow us to take this out several, you know,
4:03
several iterations,
4:04
that the Lancet fairly is disclosing a mobile computer being associated with the driver.
4:09
Judge Chen
The Lancet's mobile computer is connected to a dashboard display, right?
4:17
So information that comes into the mobile computer gets displayed on the dashboard.
4:24
And then the taxi driver, obviously, can see...
4:28
and interact with the dashboard display in that way.
4:32
And so I guess in that sense,
4:35
there is arguably some level of connectedness between the taxi driver and those components,
4:44
as opposed to, I don't know, the axle of the taxi cab.
4:49
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Okay, I understand.
4:50
Judge Chen
That associate with the driver, you know, that's a further stretch.
4:53
But there's something else going on here that might bring...
4:58
the taxi driver closer to that mobile computer through the dashboard display
5:03
in such a manner that maybe it's not unreasonable to say
5:07
that, in fact, the mobile computer is associated with the taxi driver.
5:13
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
So in response to that, Judge Chen,
5:15
I want to just say the PTAB NorLift has argued,
5:19
and PTAB hasn't found,
5:21
that it's the combination of the display and mobile computer that satisfies this limitation.
5:25
They've only said it's the mobile computer.
5:27
But also, neither of these things are associated with the driver.
5:30
The display is disclosed as being a dash-mounted display.
5:37
It's part of the vehicle.
5:38
And we know that the specification of the patents at issue
5:45
define mobile communication device as being any portable wireless device.
5:50
That dash-mounted display is not disclosed as being portable.
5:54
Neither is the mobile computer.
5:55
And so...
5:57
Why does Wallenstedt say mobile?
5:59
I'm sorry?
6:00
Judge Chen
Why does Wallenstedt say mobile for mobile computer?
6:03
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
So I think there's a difference between mobile and portable, right?
6:06
Like mobile, it's moving because the vehicle's moving.
6:09
Portable denotes that it can be carried.
6:14
Judge Chen
Maybe.
6:15
Okay.
6:15
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Yes.
6:16
Okay.
6:16
So for at least these reasons, I'm running out of time here.
6:19
I would say that the PTAB has not shown by substantial evidence
6:22
that there is this limitation.
6:24
Judge Taranto
And you will have the six minutes for...
6:28
The two things you will do during that.
6:32
Yes, you're next.
6:51
Appellee Attorney
Thank you, Your Honor.
6:51
I may have pleased the court.
6:53
I'll begin with the Wallenstedt issue,
6:54
but then I want to move to the cross-appeal as well.
6:57
With respect to this Wallenstedt disclosure...
7:01
Judge Taranto
Can you speak up a little bit?
7:02
Sure, louder.
7:03
Appellee Attorney
Yes, I'm happy to do that.
7:04
With respect to this Wallenstedt issue,
7:07
I think it's important to note that, you know,
7:09
here the patent owner is just challenging the unsubstantial evidence review,
7:14
the evidence that the board is relying on to make its fact,
7:16
actual findings.
7:17
If you read the board's opinion,
7:18
it'll be clear that the board explicitly discredited
7:22
patent owner's expert testimony.
7:24
They also criticized patent owner for misrepresenting our expert's testimony.
7:28
And they found that Wallenstedt,
7:30
as is taught in the actual disclosure of Wallenstedt itself,
7:36
has a, quote,
7:38
driver dashboard display connected to this mobile device that's in the car.
7:41
So it's clear that what the car has is a driver computer.
7:46
The board was perfectly entitled to make that factual finding,
7:49
which it did, for instance,
7:50
on page 182 of the final written decision.
7:53
Judge Taranto
Was there a request for a further construction of associated or some other term that...
8:01
Appellee Attorney
Neither party explicitly asked for any such explicit construction,
8:05
Your Honor,
8:05
and the board appeared to be applying the plain meaning correctly
8:09
because associate is a broad term.
8:12
Judge Chen
Would you say that the taxi car's muffler is associated with the taxi driver?
8:17
Appellee Attorney
Yes.
8:18
I mean, it wouldn't be necessary here,
8:20
but yes, I mean, it's associated with the driver
8:22
because the driver is in control of the car.
8:25
Yes, I would.
8:26
But this is obviously much more direct because here there is...
8:29
Judge Chen
Is the gasoline in the gas tank associated with the taxi driver?
8:32
Appellee Attorney
When it's in the gas tank, yes.
8:34
I mean, I don't see any reason why it wouldn't be associated with a driver at that point.
8:39
But again, here we have a...
8:41
Literally, the reference calls it a driver dashboard display, right?
8:45
It's clear that the driver is interacting,
8:46
with his computer directly,
8:48
just as he would be interacting directly with the gasoline
8:50
if you were to pump it into the car at that point.
8:52
So I think the answer is yes.
8:54
But just to get back to your question, Judge Toronto,
8:56
about the claim construction issue,
8:58
it's also useful to note at page 142 of the record,
9:01
the board also criticized Patner's argument
9:04
as being inconsistent with the specification itself,
9:07
which describes mobile communication devices broadly.
9:11
So to the extent there was any sort of claim interpretation happening there,
9:14
it would have been in respect to this mobile communication device.
9:16
Which they found was a broad term
9:18
and could cover the driver display.
9:20
Unless there's any questions about that,
9:22
I want to turn to the cross-appeal on the amended claims.
9:25
I'm also happy to address any other appeal points
9:27
that the court has questions with,
9:29
but let's turn to the cross-appeal.
9:32
And let me start with the subject matter eligibility issue under Section 101.
9:36
Judge Taranto
Can you...
9:37
I would prefer, at least, if you started with written description.
9:40
Sure.
9:40
Which is not quite, but something like a one-paragraph issue.
9:47
Appellee Attorney
A one-paragraph?
9:47
A one-paragraph issue.
9:48
Paragraph 30?
9:49
Paragraph 30, yes.
9:50
In the specification.
9:53
Judge Taranto
That's the bottom of column five, top of column six.
9:56
Appellee Attorney
Correct, correct.
9:57
So with respect to the 112 issue,
9:59
I mean, our argument is essentially that the board made a mistake
10:02
either because it found support in paragraph 30 for this claim element
10:06
that really wasn't there,
10:07
or to the extent that they were correct
10:09
and what's in paragraph 30 is sufficient to teach this claim element,
10:12
that that same disclosure is in Kimbler,
10:14
the prior art that we were asserting renders this claim invalid.
10:16
So the board's reasoning is just incoherent in our view.
10:22
It's either the case, if they're right,
10:23
that there's enough support there,
10:25
then the prior art invalidates the claims.
10:26
And if, as we think, they're wrong,
10:28
but that description is not sufficient,
10:30
then the claims obviously are not supported
10:32
and should not have been allowed.
10:34
Judge Taranto
That way of making the point suggests, in my mind, a remand.
10:39
I assume you want more than a remand,
10:41
and so you really ought to plunk down one way or the other
10:44
on what you think that...
10:46
Paragraph means.
10:48
Appellee Attorney
What, paragraph 30 means?
10:49
Yeah, so in our...
10:50
Well, and I think we are explicit in the brief.
10:51
We don't think paragraph 30 has sufficient support
10:54
for what's required here because, again, we think...
10:58
You know, the board obviously cited to several other paragraphs,
11:00
all of which have to do with the signal itself
11:02
and not the actual indicator.
11:03
Just get to paragraph 30.
11:04
Yeah, so paragraph 30, there's one sentence in paragraph 30,
11:07
which is, alternatively,
11:08
the vehicle identification system may be adapted
11:11
to allow the driver to enter a command
11:13
on the driver's mobile communication device
11:15
so that another code,
11:16
or indicator, or other indicator,
11:19
can be generated for the next rider
11:20
who's going to share the same vehicle.
11:22
That's the entire sentence, I think,
11:23
that would support, purportedly, the board's conclusion here.
11:26
But it's useful to note,
11:28
nothing in that sentence describes this indicator
11:31
being generated by the central controller,
11:32
as the claim requires.
11:34
And in the yellow brief,
11:35
RSDI admits that these claims require
11:37
that this indicator be generated
11:39
not by the driver's device,
11:40
but by the controller up in the central controller.
11:43
Judge Chen
If the substitute claim 29 requires
11:46
the indicator...
11:46
Is the indicator to be generated by the controller?
11:49
Appellee Attorney
Well, that's what they say in their yellow brief.
11:51
Judge Chen
No, I mean, let's just look at the claim together.
11:54
Yeah, yeah.
11:55
What does it say?
11:56
It says, I thought substitute claim 29 said...
12:00
Appellee Attorney
I mean, 29B is the generating
12:02
by creating an indicator,
12:04
an indicator signal...
12:06
Judge Hughes
That...
12:07
Appellee Attorney
In response to receiving the notification signal.
12:10
And that notification signal itself is received...
12:17
Judge Taranto
By the driver.
12:21
Appellee Attorney
Yeah, so that is...
12:22
Judge Taranto
I thought your principal point...
12:23
Was not the one you are now making,
12:25
but rather that this one sentence,
12:29
which is the one thing that talks about
12:30
creating an indicator,
12:32
does not say, as claims do require,
12:36
that the indicator be created
12:40
in the substitute claim
12:42
after a notification symbol
12:44
when you're close to the second rider.
12:47
That's what we're talking about.
12:49
Appellee Attorney
Correct, correct.
12:50
To the pickup location,
12:51
which in this case would be a second rider.
12:52
Judge Taranto
And I guess I was taking...
12:53
I was taking this sentence
12:55
with the sentence that came before it
12:57
as presenting...
12:59
Well, as indicating that
13:02
as the sentence begins,
13:05
alternatively,
13:05
this is an alternative
13:07
to sending a notification signal at all.
13:11
Appellee Attorney
No, I agree.
13:12
I agree.
13:13
And I think two things.
13:15
I think that's true,
13:15
but also that sentence itself
13:17
has nothing to do
13:18
with the presence of the second rider
13:20
near the vehicle.
13:20
It just says,
13:21
now I'm going to pick up a second rider,
13:22
so I'm going to press a button
13:24
that generates...
13:24
Right.
13:24
Judge Chen
That gets to Judge Toronto's point.
13:27
Yeah.
13:27
With the alternatively word in there,
13:30
it sets off two different embodiments.
13:33
Embodiment one,
13:34
when the driver is close to the passenger,
13:40
send a notification signal to the car,
13:43
and then the car will generate
13:44
an indicatory signal,
13:46
just like in all the other embodiments.
13:48
Alternatively,
13:49
instead of doing all of that,
13:52
just have the taxi car
13:53
be a second rider.
13:54
Generate a code.
13:55
Correct.
13:56
And send that out.
13:57
Appellee Attorney
Yeah, I think we're...
13:58
Judge Chen
And so, in either alternative,
14:01
one component of the claim is missing,
14:04
either the notification signal
14:05
or the generation of indicator
14:10
at the taxi car.
14:12
Appellee Attorney
Yes.
14:12
I mean, I think we're in complete agreement,
14:14
and that's the argument
14:14
we made repeatedly to the board
14:16
that none of these disclosures
14:18
that the board relies on...
14:19
Judge Chen
And what the board's analysis
14:20
arguably looks like
14:21
is it removed the word alternatively
14:23
from this paragraph.
14:24
So, you have a notification signal
14:26
sent from the controller
14:28
to the car
14:29
when the car is close to the pickup,
14:32
and then after that,
14:34
continuing on,
14:35
removing the word alternatively,
14:37
the system can be adapted
14:40
so that the driver's phone
14:41
can generate a code.
14:43
Appellee Attorney
I mean, that is certainly
14:45
a plausible explanation
14:47
for what the board did.
14:48
I'm not going to speculate
14:49
as to whether they just ignored
14:51
the word alternatively or...
14:52
Judge Chen
It's either that,
14:52
or they forgot how they had interpreted
14:54
the word alternatively.
14:54
...indictory signal earlier
14:56
to not necessarily require
14:58
the generation of a code
14:59
at the same time.
15:00
Perhaps, yes.
15:01
Appellee Attorney
I mean, I don't know which it is,
15:03
but either way, as we say,
15:04
we think the board erred,
15:05
and there was no 112 support
15:06
for these claims.
15:07
Judge Chen
Why don't you talk about 101?
15:08
Appellee Attorney
I'm happy to talk about 101,
15:09
unless the court has any other questions.
15:11
So, with respect to 101,
15:13
you know, this to us is...
15:15
These amended claims to us,
15:16
I think, are just sort of
15:17
prototypical invalid claims
15:19
under 101.
15:20
They explicitly recite
15:21
a mental step performed by a user,
15:23
which is what the claims
15:23
are directed to.
15:24
The mental step of identifying
15:25
your taxi by matching
15:27
some indicator on the taxi
15:29
to some indicator
15:29
that's associated with the ride
15:31
on your phone.
15:32
What the board did to overcome...
15:35
And it seemed that the board
15:36
was agreeing with us
15:36
because they did find
15:37
that there was additional exception
15:38
under the PTO's guidelines.
15:40
But the problem is
15:41
that the board went on
15:42
to apply this three-step
15:43
subject matter eligibility test
15:45
that the PTO applies.
15:47
Judge Taranto
Why don't you just ignore
15:48
the guidelines structure,
15:50
which is confusing
15:51
and is not governing,
15:53
and just talk about,
15:54
how you think it should be analyzed
15:56
in terms of our case law.
15:58
Absolutely.
15:58
So it's identifying
16:00
after a series of communications,
16:02
a carefully structured
16:03
series of communications
16:04
to solve a problem of trust
16:07
when somebody's about
16:08
to get into a stranger's car.
16:10
Appellee Attorney
Okay, but that...
16:11
Even assuming that...
16:12
Judge Taranto
Is that eligible or not?
16:13
Appellee Attorney
I would say no,
16:14
but I don't even think
16:15
that's what's going on here.
16:16
I think these are just
16:17
very common sense recitations
16:18
of sending signals
16:20
so that the user can identify
16:23
their dispatch task
16:24
and those are the prototypical
16:25
examples of things
16:26
that are not subject matter eligible
16:28
under Alice in this court's case law.
16:30
This is not a case
16:31
like the EDR Holdings
16:32
or the other cases
16:33
where there is arguably
16:34
some technological solution
16:36
to a technological problem.
16:38
And, you know,
16:39
I know the Patent Office yesterday...
16:42
Judge Chen
This claim has phones
16:43
Appellee Attorney
and a display.
16:45
Exactly.
16:45
Not a controller.
16:46
It's got...
16:47
It's signals.
16:48
It is using
16:49
mobile computing technology
16:50
that's existed for a very long time
16:52
to solve a human problem,
16:54
allowing you to match a taxi.
16:56
Judge Andrews,
16:57
in the District Court case,
16:59
and we cite this in the appendix,
17:00
noted in his short opinion
17:01
on this point
17:02
that it looked to him
17:03
very much like a shiny...
17:04
I guess you're saying
17:04
Judge Chen
all of those things
17:04
that I just itemized
17:05
are just merely conventional tools
17:07
to carry out an abstract idea
17:09
and there's nothing going on
17:10
in this claim
17:10
that even hints at improving
17:14
a computer or networks
17:16
or anything like that.
17:17
Appellee Attorney
That's right.
17:18
There's no improvement
17:18
to computing.
17:19
There's no improvement
17:20
to mobile computing.
17:21
They're using
17:21
mobile computing devices
17:22
exactly as mobile computing devices
17:24
are known to be.
17:24
They're known to be used.
17:25
They're described that way
17:26
in the specification.
17:27
There's nothing unconventional
17:28
to describe in the specification.
17:29
There's nothing unconventional...
17:30
Judge Hughes
If a passenger prearranges
17:32
a car service
17:33
by calling in saying,
17:35
I need a car at the airport
17:36
at 3 p.m. on this day
17:37
and says,
17:38
my name is Passenger X,
17:40
and the car drives up
17:41
and holds a sign that says,
17:43
I'm here for Passenger X,
17:45
that's what this is doing,
17:47
but doing it with phones
17:49
over a network.
17:50
Appellee Attorney
That's exactly right.
17:51
And that's exactly my point.
17:53
That's what Judge Andrews
17:54
was saying
17:54
when he made the point
17:54
and made an analogy
17:55
to the Seinfeld episode
17:56
where George steals
17:58
someone's car
17:58
at the airport
17:59
by saying he's the person
18:01
whose name is on the sign.
18:02
So it's exactly right.
18:02
Judge Taranto
This is O'Brien?
18:04
Appellee Attorney
Yes, exactly.
18:05
The O'Brien episode.
18:08
So in any event,
18:09
yeah, so step one,
18:09
I think it's clear
18:10
there's nothing new there.
18:11
And in step two,
18:12
there's really nothing
18:12
in the claims
18:13
that they're even pointing to,
18:14
arguably,
18:14
as meaning
18:15
such a better...
18:16
Judge Hughes
I mean, it's just using
18:16
the phones
18:17
and the capacity
18:18
of the phones they have
18:19
to talk to each other,
18:20
but it doesn't even
18:20
really tell us
18:21
how the phones do it.
18:23
Are they using GPS?
18:24
Are they using
18:25
some other ways
18:26
that the phones identify her?
18:27
It's the idea
18:28
of using the phones
18:30
through some kind of,
18:31
you know,
18:32
networking
18:33
or, you know,
18:34
electronic signals
18:36
to show some kind
18:37
of matching signal.
18:40
Appellee Attorney
Correct.
18:40
Correct.
18:41
Yep.
18:42
That's right.
18:43
Unless the court
18:44
has any further questions,
18:45
I'm happy to reserve
18:45
the time.
18:46
Okay.
18:46
We'll have you
18:46
Judge Taranto
at rebuttal time.
18:53
Ms. Dawson,
18:54
you're next, right?
18:55
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
I'm sorry?
18:56
Judge Taranto
You're next, yes?
18:57
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
I'm last?
18:58
Judge Taranto
You're next.
18:58
I'm next.
18:59
Yes.
18:59
Yes, okay.
19:02
Judge Chen
You're splitting time
19:03
with PTO?
19:04
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Yes.
19:05
Three minutes.
19:06
All right.
19:07
On 101.
19:09
So I guess I'll jump
19:11
to written description
19:12
and address what you were
19:13
talking about
19:14
with the Lips Council.
19:15
In that paragraph 30,
19:18
what is disclosed,
19:19
the Patent Office
19:20
did read
19:20
to be all one
19:22
potential embodiment.
19:24
And I understand
19:24
you're focusing in
19:25
on the word
19:26
alternatively,
19:27
but I think
19:28
what the Patent Office
19:29
was doing,
19:29
and it's supported
19:30
by substantial evidence
19:31
within the,
19:32
this disclosure
19:34
at paragraph 30.
19:35
And first of all,
19:36
paragraph 30
19:36
is still referencing
19:38
system 10,
19:39
which is the main system
19:41
for just having
19:42
one rider.
19:43
And so all of those
19:44
elements would apply
19:45
here as well.
19:46
But what paragraph 30
19:47
says,
19:49
and what the PTAB
19:50
kept saying
19:51
to live throughout
19:51
the briefing is,
19:52
you're only focusing
19:53
on this one sentence
19:54
within paragraph 30,
19:56
but it's the entirety
19:56
of paragraph 30.
19:58
And the PTAB
19:59
was reading that
20:00
as one potential
20:02
embodiment.
20:02
And what it says
20:04
is when the first rider
20:06
gets into the vehicle,
20:08
it deletes the indicator
20:11
associated with that rider.
20:13
And then it generates
20:14
a notification signal
20:15
or can generate
20:16
a notification signal
20:17
for the second driver
20:19
when they're close
20:20
to the second driver.
20:21
And then, yes,
20:22
it says alternatively.
20:24
Judge Taranto
But that's,
20:24
I mean,
20:24
right.
20:25
Yeah.
20:26
That's kind of
20:27
the big deal.
20:28
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Right, right.
20:29
That they can
20:30
generate another,
20:31
the driver can generate
20:33
another code.
20:34
But what's happening here,
20:35
and I think what the PTAB
20:36
is reading fairly in,
20:37
is the notification signal
20:39
is still sent.
20:40
But normally,
20:41
that notification signal
20:42
automatically sends
20:43
the driver's device
20:45
the new indicator
20:48
and the signal
20:48
for the indicator.
20:49
But instead,
20:50
because we have
20:51
multiple different riders,
20:53
it allows for
20:54
a different embodiment
20:55
where they get
20:55
the notification signal
20:57
and they can just
20:57
enter a command
20:58
to get the new
20:59
generated indicator.
21:00
Judge Chen
I got a little lost there
21:00
in your explanation.
21:01
My understanding
21:02
of this patent
21:03
is that
21:04
what the controller
21:05
is sending
21:06
to the taxi car
21:07
is a notification signal.
21:09
And then,
21:11
it's,
21:12
and then the taxi car
21:14
generates
21:14
an indicator signal.
21:16
Right?
21:18
That's,
21:18
that's what the claim
21:19
calls for.
21:20
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
The mobile computer,
21:21
mobile computer.
21:22
Okay.
21:22
Yeah, of the driver.
21:23
Judge Chen
And,
21:24
I thought I just heard you say
21:26
that normally
21:27
what happens
21:28
is the controller
21:29
sends
21:29
not only a notification signal,
21:32
but also an
21:33
indicatory signal.
21:34
Oh, I'm sorry.
21:35
That's not right.
21:35
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
No, the,
21:36
what the PTAB is saying
21:38
and what the disclosure is,
21:40
is that,
21:40
and they're relying
21:41
on these other paragraphs
21:42
to,
21:43
to say this,
21:44
but it's the
21:45
notification signal
21:46
that activates
21:47
the driver's phone
21:49
to put up
21:51
the indicatory signal.
21:53
So,
21:53
it,
21:53
the notification signal
21:54
comes,
21:55
that activates
21:56
their phone
21:56
to create
21:57
the indicatory signal
21:59
and indicator.
22:00
And so instead,
22:01
in this,
22:02
embodiment,
22:03
because we have
22:03
multiple riders,
22:04
the,
22:05
the,
22:06
the driver can just
22:07
enter a command
22:08
to get that new indicator
22:10
for the second driver,
22:11
or second rider,
22:12
excuse me.
22:14
Judge Chen
So,
22:14
I,
22:15
I don't understand,
22:16
what is your view
22:18
of what work
22:19
is the word
22:20
alternatively doing
22:21
in the middle
22:22
of the paragraph?
22:23
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
So,
22:23
the alternatively
22:24
is in,
22:25
in,
22:26
it's in,
22:27
normally the,
22:28
the notification signal
22:30
activates the
22:31
driver's phone,
22:33
to create
22:34
the indicatory signal.
22:35
The alternatively is,
22:37
instead of that
22:38
just popping up,
22:39
they can,
22:40
they can enter a command
22:41
to say,
22:42
give me that new
22:43
indicator now
22:44
for the second rider.
22:46
Judge Chen
So,
22:47
therefore,
22:47
in this alternative,
22:49
there,
22:50
there is no requirement
22:51
for a notification signal
22:53
to be sent to
22:54
the taxi driver's
22:57
mobile device.
22:58
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
No.
22:58
So,
22:58
the notification signal
23:00
is still sent
23:00
because that says
23:01
you're within
23:02
a predetermined location.
23:03
of now the second
23:04
driver.
23:05
But,
23:06
the alternatively
23:07
is,
23:07
instead of,
23:08
because of receipt
23:09
of the
23:11
notification
23:12
generating
23:12
automatically
23:13
because it's activated
23:15
the driver's phone,
23:16
the indicator,
23:17
they can enter
23:18
a command
23:19
once they receive
23:21
the notification
23:21
to get that second
23:22
signal for the new
23:23
passenger.
23:25
Judge Chen
How is that
23:26
different from
23:27
how the system
23:28
ordinarily works?
23:30
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
I'm sorry,
23:31
how is that
23:31
different from?
23:31
How is
23:31
Judge Chen
what you just
23:32
described
23:33
different from
23:34
how the system
23:35
ordinarily works?
23:37
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Well,
23:38
so the system,
23:39
the,
23:39
normally,
23:40
the phone is activated
23:41
with the receipt
23:42
of the first
23:43
notification signal.
23:44
So,
23:44
it's already activated.
23:46
Now,
23:47
we have a second
23:47
passenger,
23:48
so it doesn't need
23:49
to be activated again.
23:50
They get the
23:51
notification signal,
23:52
so they hit the
23:53
enter a command
23:54
to get that new
23:55
indicator.
23:56
Judge Chen
It sounds like
23:57
the taxi cab
23:59
driver's phone
24:01
is going to be
24:03
generated
24:04
by generating
24:04
an indicator,
24:05
indicator,
24:07
indicatory signal
24:08
in response
24:09
to receiving
24:10
a notification
24:10
signal,
24:12
in your view.
24:13
And if that's
24:14
true,
24:15
then I,
24:16
that's really
24:16
no different
24:17
than how
24:17
the system
24:18
ordinarily works,
24:19
because the system
24:20
ordinarily has
24:22
the taxi cab
24:24
driver's phone
24:25
generate an
24:26
indicatory signal
24:27
in response
24:28
to receiving
24:28
a notification
24:29
signal.
24:31
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
It's the same thing.
24:32
Judge Chen
I don't, so again,
24:33
the alternative,
24:35
alternatively,
24:35
word isn't doing
24:36
anything.
24:37
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Yeah, the alternative
24:38
is, so normally
24:39
the notification
24:39
signal is,
24:40
is activating
24:41
the phone,
24:42
the, that,
24:43
they don't have,
24:44
the driver doesn't
24:44
have to do anything
24:45
with the first time
24:46
that that happens.
24:47
It just,
24:47
it just happens
24:48
that the now
24:49
indicatory signal
24:50
representing an
24:51
indicator happens.
24:54
This, this embodiment
24:55
is because now
24:56
we have another
24:57
rider,
24:58
and so the
24:59
alternative is
25:00
now they can
25:01
enter a command
25:02
because it's already
25:04
been activated.
25:05
Judge Chen
So if we could
25:06
just get to 101
25:07
really quickly.
25:08
Yeah.
25:09
This, why isn't
25:10
this just the
25:10
abstract idea
25:12
of helping
25:13
two strangers
25:14
find each other
25:15
and just using
25:17
phones and
25:19
display
25:19
in order to
25:21
do that?
25:21
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Yeah, the key,
25:22
the whole key
25:23
to this patent
25:23
is trying to
25:24
provide security
25:25
in this,
25:26
within this network
25:26
system so that
25:28
everybody knows
25:28
that the right
25:29
person is getting
25:29
in the right vehicle.
25:30
And that's done
25:32
by,
25:33
Judge Hughes
I don't understand
25:34
that at all.
25:34
What do you mean?
25:35
How does it provide
25:36
security by the
25:37
network system?
25:38
Right.
25:39
All this is doing
25:39
is letting the phones
25:41
talk to each other
25:42
and then it sends
25:43
up a signal so the
25:44
passenger knows
25:45
they're getting
25:45
in the right car.
25:46
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
So the way that it
25:47
does it is by
25:49
first sending that
25:50
notification signal
25:51
only at a specific
25:52
time when the,
25:54
the car is close
25:55
to the,
25:56
the rider.
25:57
And only in
25:58
response to that,
25:59
at that time,
26:01
creating the
26:02
indicator and then
26:03
displaying it.
26:04
So the,
26:04
the indicator is
26:06
only existing
26:07
for a very short
26:08
period of time.
26:09
Judge Hughes
This sounds no
26:09
different than holding
26:10
up a sign with
26:11
somebody's name on
26:12
it or if they didn't
26:13
want to give their
26:14
name a code that
26:15
they can look at.
26:16
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Well it is different
26:17
because how would,
26:18
I mean it has to be
26:19
a unique indicator,
26:19
it can't just be
26:20
their name.
26:20
Okay.
26:21
Judge Chen
What about this
26:22
hypothetical?
26:23
What if the claim
26:23
were a little
26:24
different and it
26:26
was more about
26:27
a system,
26:29
again,
26:32
a system that
26:32
order a car.
26:33
And the system,
26:34
there's a passenger,
26:36
she's at the airport,
26:37
her name's Jenny,
26:39
and she calls the
26:40
dispatcher and says
26:41
I'm at the airport,
26:42
I,
26:42
I need a car.
26:44
Dispatcher looks on
26:45
his big board map
26:46
and sees that there
26:48
is a cab driver
26:49
within a mile of
26:50
the airport.
26:51
Calls the cab driver
26:52
and says,
26:53
you need to pick up
26:54
Jenny at the airport.
26:56
And here's her
26:57
number.
26:59
And then the cab
27:00
driver drives to
27:03
the airport and
27:03
calls the dispatcher
27:04
and says,
27:04
he's got a whiteboard
27:05
and it's attached
27:06
to his window.
27:08
And he writes down
27:11
Jenny's number
27:12
on the whiteboard.
27:14
And then calls
27:15
Jenny and says,
27:18
hey,
27:18
I'm coming to
27:19
get you,
27:19
Jenny,
27:20
I've got your
27:20
number on my
27:21
whiteboard and
27:22
your number is
27:23
8-6-7-5-3-0-9.
27:28
What I just
27:29
described,
27:30
is that PANG
27:31
eligible?
27:31
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
I don't know
27:33
if that is.
27:33
It's got
27:34
phones?
27:34
Judge Chen
It's got
27:34
a whiteboard?
27:36
Or is that
27:37
just a method
27:38
of organizing
27:39
human activity
27:40
just using
27:42
available technology
27:44
for their
27:45
normal,
27:45
conventional
27:46
purposes?
27:47
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
I don't know
27:48
if that is,
27:48
but I know
27:49
that the
27:49
present substitute
27:50
claims are
27:51
patent eligible
27:52
because of the
27:53
fact that the
27:53
indicator is
27:54
created at
27:56
the time that
27:56
it's close to
27:57
the rider.
27:58
And that's
27:59
when it's
27:59
created.
27:59
That's my
28:00
example.
28:05
Judge Chen
That's
28:05
her phone
28:06
number.
28:06
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
But it's a
28:07
unique indicator.
28:08
It's disclosed
28:09
as being a
28:09
code.
28:10
It's using
28:11
Judge Hughes
the basic
28:12
capacities of
28:13
these phones
28:14
to do what
28:15
the phones
28:15
do.
28:16
But the
28:17
idea for
28:18
this is
28:18
so that the
28:19
passenger can
28:20
identify that
28:21
they're getting
28:21
into the
28:21
right car.
28:23
That's not
28:24
an eligible
28:25
idea.
28:25
And using
28:26
conventional
28:26
computer
28:35
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
data,
28:35
we can
28:36
But we
28:36
that says
28:36
that even
28:37
if it's
28:38
just
28:38
Judge Hughes
those cases
28:39
involve
28:40
improvements
28:41
to
28:43
something
28:43
that's
28:44
specific to
28:44
the computer
28:45
environment.
28:46
Everything we're
28:46
talking about
28:47
here,
28:47
this is not
28:48
to make
28:48
the phones
28:49
work better
28:50
with each
28:50
other.
28:50
This is
28:51
to use
28:52
that technology
28:53
to enable
28:55
human
28:55
interactions.
28:57
So there
28:57
are different
28:58
cases.
29:01
The end
29:02
point of
29:02
this is
29:03
to generate
29:03
a signal
29:04
for human
29:05
consumption,
29:05
right?
29:06
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
The end
29:07
point of
29:07
this is
29:08
to
29:08
Can you
29:09
Judge Hughes
just answer
29:09
that?
29:09
That's a
29:10
yes or
29:10
no question.
29:10
The end
29:12
point is
29:12
to generate
29:13
a signal
29:13
for the
29:14
passenger
29:14
to realize
29:15
that they're
29:15
getting in
29:15
the correct
29:16
path.
29:17
Yes?
29:18
Yes.
29:19
That's
29:20
not a
29:20
technological
29:21
problem.
29:22
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
But it's
29:23
a technological
29:24
solution
29:25
to it
29:26
to ensure
29:27
that there's
29:27
this two
29:28
notification
29:28
or this
29:30
two signal
29:31
Judge Hughes
There's
29:32
lots of
29:33
technological
29:41
tools out
29:41
things that
29:42
were physically
29:43
impossible
29:43
before computing
29:45
power that
29:46
were still
29:46
just general
29:47
abstract ideas
29:48
that were
29:48
somehow became
29:49
possible due
29:50
to computing
29:51
power aren't
29:52
eligible.
29:52
That sounds
29:53
a lot like
29:54
that to
29:54
me that
29:55
you're using
29:56
some but
29:56
this one
29:57
was possible
29:58
before using
29:59
hand printed
30:00
cards and
30:01
phones and
30:01
calling people.
30:12
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
Yes,
30:17
I think
30:19
that's
30:23
pretty
30:25
true and
30:26
it's
30:26
true
30:26
that
30:27
the
30:27
more
30:28
you
30:30
try to
30:30
think
30:30
it
30:30
the
30:31
more
30:31
you
30:31
think
30:31
about
30:31
it
30:33
more
30:39
you
30:40
Unknown
think
30:40
Appellant Attorney (Michelle Dawson)
about
30:40
it
30:40
the
30:41
is created only then to make sure that we don't have an indicator existing for a long time that
30:47
could be tampered with so that people could intentionally have somebody get into the wrong
30:52
Judge Taranto
vehicle. Thank you. Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the courts. I want to address
31:10
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
this Section 101 issue. The reason that these claims are eligible under Step 1 of ALICE is
31:18
because they do provide a technological... Under Step 1? I thought the board found that they weren't
31:22
Judge Hughes
eligible under Step 1 and had to get to Step 2. No, so the board... Oh, is this your nonsensical
31:28
Step 0, Step 2A stuff? So the board found that they were eligible under Step 1, but they referred
31:36
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
to it as Step 2. Much like this court's precedent and this court's decisions in Section 101,
31:42
what the board did was first look at the claims and determine if any of the limitations,
31:48
recite a judicial exception. And here, one of the limitations did. One of the limitations
31:53
recited a method of organizing human activity, as Judge Chen recognized. These claims...
31:58
Judge Hughes
So the... But let me... One of the limitations. Do you think these claims are not directed
32:02
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
to an abstract idea? That's correct. Not as a whole, because the Supreme Court's precedent
32:06
and this court's precedent require that... What are they directed to? What are they directed
32:11
to? They are directed to a technological... No, you can't mouth the just generic things
32:18
Judge Hughes
and keep them out of an eligibility problem. What specifically are they directed to that's
32:23
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
not an abstract idea? An improvement to Internet-based right share
32:27
of technology. That is what they are directed to.
32:30
How? How? By providing, as my friend indicated,
32:34
by providing these specific generation... I'm sorry, is the Internet required here?
32:40
Well, the phone... Just a mobile communication device.
32:43
Judge Taranto
It's a mobile communication device. So the Internet is not actually required.
32:46
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
Well, the... What...
32:48
The way that you are accessing the device is through the Internet, right?
32:52
Like, it's kind of like an Uber app.
32:55
Judge Taranto
Where's that in the claims?
32:56
That's not in the claims.
32:57
It's not in the claims.
32:57
You can do all this by text message.
32:59
It's not in the claims.
33:00
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
You can do it all by the phone, but the signals are being sent through a controller, right, and through a network.
33:07
The network is required.
33:09
Some kind of...
33:10
Judge Taranto
Okay, well, that's different.
33:11
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
Some capability for the controller and the phones to be sending these, generating these notification signals at a predetermined time.
33:21
Judge Chen
What's the improvement in the network or the computer or anything that could remotely be regarded as technology?
33:27
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
So the improvement is not in the individual components.
33:30
Judge Chen
No, no, don't tell me what it's not.
33:33
Tell me what it is, because I've been waiting and waiting and waiting for somebody to tell it to me.
33:38
So now's your chance.
33:40
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
The improvement is...
33:41
Is in providing a more secure ride share technology service.
33:46
Judge Chen
That's the result.
33:47
How do...
33:47
What's the means?
33:49
What is the technological improved means of accomplishing the result?
33:54
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
The means of accomplishing the result are these sequence of steps.
33:57
They're very specific steps.
33:59
Judge Chen
Which sequence of steps?
34:00
Just reciting the entire claim and then automatically, voila, we're going to just deem it to be an improved technical means?
34:06
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
The generation of a notification signal when the driver and the rider are...
34:10
predetermined distance from each other, the generation of the indicator, and the generation of that code on all of the devices.
34:17
It's generated...
34:18
Judge Taranto
The airport pickup example.
34:20
So the airport pickup.
34:21
Why is that different?
34:21
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
Thank you for reminding me about that hypothetical.
34:23
The airport pickup hypothetical.
34:24
In that scenario, while the rider may have information regarding which car to get into,
34:33
the driver has no way to assess that that rider is the rider that they are picking up.
34:39
They're fully trusting the rider to be an honest person.
34:44
Judge Hughes
You don't need these claims to do that.
34:46
When you call the car service in advance and arrange it, they could also say,
34:53
in order to make sure our driver knows who you are, you need to print out a sign that has this code on it so the driver can match it.
35:02
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
But this process provides all of that within your mobile devices.
35:07
Judge Hughes
This process automates it, right?
35:08
Right.
35:09
I've never found automating something that can be done with basically pen and paper to be able to...
35:15
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
But this is a process that provides a unique code.
35:19
In your scenario, the person...
35:21
Judge Hughes
That's a unique code, too.
35:22
I call up the car service.
35:24
The car service says, our driver is going to be there in this kind of car.
35:28
He will hold up a sign with a code on it.
35:31
You need to hold up a sign with another unique code on it.
35:35
Here's the code.
35:36
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
But this two-way identification system?
35:39
This two-way identification system is generated through the technology that is through these devices
35:44
that are generating these notification signals and indicator signals,
35:48
which are then displayed on multiple displays, on the mobile devices as well as the...
35:52
Judge Chen
What Federal Circuit case is most similar to the facts of this case that found the claims to be patent eligible?
36:00
And don't say DDR or BASCOM or Koninklake KPN.
36:05
I am all too familiar with those three cases.
36:08
And they don't...
36:09
They don't help.
36:10
Intervenor Attorney (Kakoli Caprihan)
So, other cases that have held that...
36:13
Which ones?
36:15
Contour IP holdings, McCrow.
36:17
Those types of cases have held that even though the individual components themselves are conventional,
36:22
overall, the specific steps that are followed provide an improvement to the underlying technology.
36:28
In Contour IP holdings, there was an improvement to a particular point of view pattern that provided specific...
36:36
It also involved the generation of signals.
36:38
The generation of video.
36:40
And then displaying that video on a display.
36:43
Those claims are very similar to the claims at issue here.
36:47
There was an improvement to the underlying technology because of the specific steps that were followed.
36:53
If there are no further questions.
36:55
Okay.
36:55
Thank you.
36:57
Yes.
37:01
Appellee Attorney
So, Your Honor, just to address Contour.
37:04
Contour solved the problem that was created by the technology in that case,
37:07
which was a point-of-view camera that you couldn't see the viewfinder.
37:09
So, there was a technological solution that was recited in the claims there.
37:12
Here, there's no technology.
37:13
There's no technological solution.
37:14
This is just using mobile computing to solve a human problem that has, you know,
37:19
hardly been practiced for many, many years.
37:20
So, unless the court has any further questions.
37:22
Judge Taranto
Can you return for a minute to the written description?
37:27
Appellee Attorney
112?
37:28
Judge Taranto
Question.
37:29
Yes.
37:29
So, at least one way that I think I heard the argument being made is that on what is, in this context,
37:40
a factual question.
37:42
Even though we're interpreting the patent at issue,
37:46
the board reasonably interpreted the paragraph to give a meaning to the term alternative
37:56
that starts after the notification signal, not before the notification signal.
38:05
So, that the alternative is not to skip a notification signal.
38:09
It is rather that the indicatory signal,
38:12
the notification signal, is created at the behest of the driver's action,
38:19
as opposed to automatically, electronically, by the device upon receiving the notification signal.
38:29
Why is that an unreasonable reading of that paragraph?
38:36
Appellee Attorney
So, the reason that I think that would not be, I mean, first of all, it just doesn't parse logically
38:42
when you read the actual paragraph.
38:44
Paragraph as a whole, paragraph 30.
38:45
So, we think if that was the reading, it is not supported by the actual language of paragraph 30.
38:51
But, looking at the text of the actual amended claim,
38:54
the requirement is that you generate, by creating an indicator, an indicatory signal,
39:01
representing the indicator in response to receiving the notification signal.
39:04
So, what is the notification signal that's still present that this indicator is generated in response to?
39:09
There would be no room for that anymore in this embodiment because it's the driver pressing a button.
39:16
So, that's why I don't see how you can get to that interpretation of what's in paragraph 30
39:21
and say that matches up with what claim element 29B now requires in the amendment.
39:26
Unknown
Okay.
39:28
Judge Taranto
Thanks to all counsel.
39:30
Case is submitted.