1. This case presents several significant and complex constitutional issues that warrant a carefully prepared petition for a writ of certiorari, which will seek review of several important issues.

2. First, it will directly raise issues regarding the scope of the express preemption clause in the Federal Meat Inspection Act ("FMIA"), located at 21 U.S.C. § 678. Below, the First Circuit ruled that Triumph and Farmer Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim that Question 3—a Massachusetts state law dictating how breeding pigs must be housed nationwide—was preempted by the FMIA. This ruling is a patent misapplication of this Court's unanimous holding in National Meat Association v. Harris, which explained the breadth of the FMIA's preemption clause and rejected the same efforts to avoid it that respondents present here. Further, this errant ruling exacerbates the long-simmering issue of states regulating over one another in an area solely within federal purview.

3. Second, the forthcoming petition will raise important issues related to the anti-discrimination principles in the Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause (and elsewhere in the Constitution). Below, the First Circuit ruled that Triumph and Farmer Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim that Question 3 violates the Constitution. But the complaint explicitly detailed the discriminatory purpose and effects of Question 3. By affirming the dismissal of these claims, the First Circuit signed off on the full range of the discriminatory purposes and effects Question 3 inflicts on the rest of the country.

4. Third, the complaint—at the very least—stated a claim that Question 3 violates the Constitution because it imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce, a formulation of the claim elucidated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 187 (1970). And yet, the First Circuit rejected that argument too, despite a majority of Justices validating such a claim against Proposition 12 in Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 403 (2023).

5. Indeed, although the overall Ross opinion was fractured, a six-Justice majority "affirmatively retain[ed] the longstanding Pike balancing test for analyzing dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state economic regulations." Ross, 598 U.S. at 403 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, one concurring Justice and four dissenting Justices (for a five-Justice majority) determined that NPPC had "identif[ied] broader, market-wide consequences of compliance" with a law similar to Question 3, and thus had stated "economic harms that our precedents have recognized can amount to a burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 397 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Those majorities should have led the First Circuit to rule here that the complaint stated a claim under Pike. But it didn't. Instead, the First Circuit ruled that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent, holding that it dictated that Question 3 was a neutral law that regulated interstate and intrastate commerce even-handedly. App. A at 24-25.

6. Lastly, Triumph and Farmer Plaintiffs also brought several additional claims—violation of the Due Process Clause; violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause; violation of the Import-Export Clause; and preemption under

Whether a 60-day extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari is appropriate under Supreme Court procedural rules