FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure Privacy
1. This case involves an important question regarding the constitutional standard for a police officer to conduct an investigative stop. It is well established that a police officer "may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). This Court has repeatedly advised that reasonable suspicion must be assessed based on "the totality of the circumstances." Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 386 (2020). This Court's precedents preclude a "divide-and-conquer analysis" where a reviewing court gives "no weight" to a relevant fact known to officers merely because the fact "was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Instead, the Court has recognized that even individually innocuous factors may combine to form reasonable suspicion, which "need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Id. at 277.
Question not identified.
Whether a reviewing court may consider all known facts, including a radio dispatch, when assessing the totality of circumstances for reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment