a. Does a notice of removal have to explicitly cite 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) as one of the bases for removal in order to avail of the reviewability of a subsequent remand decision, even if the predicate requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) are manifestly satisfied by the papers and pleadings which are included together with the notice of removal?

b. Should a notice of removal by a pro se litigant be construed liberally in keeping with the Court's prior rulings on treatment of pro se papers which are inartfully pleaded such as under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 (1976). Also see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed as to do justice.").

c. Is the "equivalent basis exception" for satisfying the "second prong" requirement under 28 USC § 1448(1) as discussed by Fenton v. Dudley, 761 F.3d 774-775 (7th Cir. 2014) — as articulated under Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219, (1975) (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966)) — good law?

d. Does racial discrimination as required under 28 USC § 1443(1) subsume discrimination against Hispanic/Latinx persons, in keeping with (a) Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 14 F.3d 59 (2nd. Cir. 2016) wherein the Second Circuit held that Hispanic constitutes a race for purposes of Title VII and Section 1981, and (b) Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) wherein the Court defined "race" to include discrimination based on "ancestry or ethnic characteristics."

e. When a state court original defendant is impleaded with a crossclaim raising federal questions, can she remove the matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446?

Whether a pro se litigant's notice of removal can satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) requirements without explicitly citing the statute when federal civil rights and racial discrimination claims are present