1. This case concerns the interpretation of regulations governing veterans' benefits. And in particular, it concerns the construction of an important regulation governing the standard for the Department of Veterans Affairs' interpretation of claims for certain disability benefits: compensation benefits and pension benefits. Compensation payments make veterans whole for service-connected disabilities. Pension payments provide a minimum-safety net for wartime veterans with little in assets or income who are elderly or permanently and totally disabled. Veterans cannot receive both compensation and pension benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(1).

2. Veterans who qualify for both types of benefits tend to be those in the greatest need and least equipped to make an informed election at the outset. VA regulation 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) assures veterans that "[t]he greater benefit will be awarded, unless the claimant specifically elects the lesser benefit." To effectuate that promise, the regulation also provides that "[a] claim by a veteran for compensation may be considered to be a claim for pension; and a claim by a veteran for pension may be considered to be a claim for compensation." Id.

3. The VA has historically evaluated pension and compensation eligibility together. Indeed, the VA has generally offered a single consolidated form for both claims, and does so today. This parallel review aids in identifying the maximum benefit for each veteran, and promotes efficiency because both claims typically require evaluating the veteran's disabilities. That longstanding practice is reflected in the VA's internal adjudication manual in 1983, only a few years before Mr. Champagne submitted his initial claim (in September 1987): "Irrespective of the items completed or the words used by the veteran [on the form submitted] if potential entitlement to either [compensation or pension] benefit exists, the claim should be processed accordingly, unless he/she specifically states he/she is not claiming one or the other." VA Manual § 21.01(d)(1) (emphasis added). The Veterans Court likewise initially recognized that § 3.151(a) created a duty to evaluate a claim for compensation as also claiming a pension and vice versa. Kellar v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 157, 162 (1994); Ferraro v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 326, 333 (1991).

4. Diverging from this long-standing interpretation, the VA and the Veterans Court did an about-face years later, reading "may" in § 3.151 as conferring discretionary power for the VA to disregard a veteran's meritorious compensation claim by choosing to consider his application form as a pension claim only. See Stewart v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 15, 18 (1997) ("The Secretary is not automatically required to treat every compensation claim as also being a pension claim or vice versa."). That is the interpretation the VA applied in Mr. Champagne's case. Champagne v. McDonough, 122 F.4th 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2024).

5. In this case, the Federal Circuit had before it a proper vehicle to address the VA's interpretation. In a precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's interpretation, holding that the VA "is allowed, but not required, to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim, and vice versa," even when declining to do so deprives the veteran of the greater benefit for which he is eligible. Champagne, 122 F.4th at 1330. The Federal Circuit misconstrued the plain

Whether a VA regulation requiring the agency to award the greater benefit to veterans unless they specifically elect the lesser benefit creates a mandatory duty to evaluate claims for both compensation and pension benefits, or merely a discretionary option