1. This case presents a question on which the Ninth Circuit has split with at least five other federal appellate courts. That question is whether a political subdivision, like a city, is an "arm of the state" for purposes of sovereign immunity and standing, and if so, is a per se rule barring a city from suing the State consistent with this Court's precedent, or rather must courts adopt a functional analysis looking to the relevant state law on political subdivisions and how that state law classifies the governmental function at issue? The Ninth Circuit below (Apx.1a-4a) continued to follow the per se rule it first set forth 45 years ago in City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980), concluding that because the City of Huntington is a municipality, that automatically makes it an arm-of-the-state, and consequently unable to sue California Governor Gavin Newsom and other state actors in their official capacity. By contrast, the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have refused to adopt such a per se rule, instead opting for a functional analysis based on state law. See, e.g., Exeter-West Greenwich Reg'l Schl. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1986) (allowing a local public school district to bring First Amendment claims against the State); Tweed-New Haven Airport authority v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2019) ("The view that subdivisions were broadly prevented from suing a state [has been] put to rest... ."); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to "hold that a municipality never has standing to sue the state of which it is a creature."); South Macomb Disposal Authority v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowing a political subdivision to bring Fourteenth Amendment claims against a city); United States v. State of Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a state university could bring Fourteenth Amendment claims against the State). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's holding cannot be squared with at least two of this Court's own precedents applying a functional test based on state law to whether a political subdivision is an arm-of-the-state. See Regents of Univ of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997) ("[The] federal question can only be answered after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency's character."); McMillan v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 784-86 (1997) (applying a similar functional test in determining whether a county sheriff acted on behalf of the State or a political subdivision in performing certain duties under state law).

2. This case involves an attempt by the State of California to prefer a generalized policy preference for high-density housing over concrete local harms, evidenced by civil-engineer experts, to water supplies, air quality, protected wetlands, and the character of the City's beach community. California has enacted a high-density housing statutory scheme in its Regional Housing Needs Allocation (

Whether a political subdivision can be categorically barred from suing a state based on a per se rule, or whether courts must conduct a functional analysis of state law to determine standing and sovereign immunity