Keegan L. Lovell v. United States
The relevant federal criminal statute requires that
"[a]ny person subject to the [Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ)] who solicits or advises another to
commit an offense under [the UCMJ] . . . shall be
punished as a court -martial may direct." 10 U.S.C. §
882 (emphasis added) . The term to "commit an offense
under the UCMJ " has been construed in other
contexts to require both jurisdiction over the offense
and that the person be subject to the UCMJ . United
States v. Ali , 71 M.J. 256, 262 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
However, in ruling against Petitioner, the A ir Force
Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the statute to
merely require that the solicited conduct be generally
considered an offense under the UCMJ if the solicited
person had been subject to the code , rather than the
solicited person actually being s ubject to the UCMJ .
This case raises the following question:
Where a federal criminal statute for solicitation
requires the person solicited to fall within a narrow
class, can a conviction be sustained if the person
solicited was not actually in that class?
Where a federal criminal statute for solicitation requires the person solicited to fall within a narrow class, can a conviction be sustained if the person solicited was not actually in that class?