1. Whether, under the Elections Clause,
U.S. Constitution Article I § 4 Clause 1, and this
Court's decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), a State may enact or
administer election laws that make success in a
State-run party primary a mandatory prerequisite to
appearing on the November general-election ballot
for United States Senate or the House of
Representatives, thereby converting the primary into
an additional "qualifying race" and, through
pervasive entwinement with non-government
organizations ("NGOs") commonly known as political
parties, directly or indirectly stripping candidates
and voters of their constitutional right to participate
fully in and make choices at the only constitutional
federal election in November.

2. Whether state officials who administer
and certify a primary-based election scheme, whose
conduct is challenged as constitutionally invalid on
its face, may invoke Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity and the Rule 12(b)(6) "plausibility"
standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal to obtain dismissal at the pleading
stage of a federal-question action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Ex parte Young seeking prospective
declaratory and injunctive relief from ongoing
violations of the Elections Clause and the First
Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and Fourteenth
Amendments; or whether, in light of the Eleventh
Amendment's limited role as a shield against suits by
citizens of other States and foreign subjects, States
must divest from automatically applying that
Amendment to bar suits by their own citizens and
courts must give constitutional validity precedence
over plausibility-based dismissal.

3. Whether, consistent with Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)—which holds
that any statute or governmental act repugnant to
the Constitution is void from its inception—courts
adjudicating constitutional challenges to a State's
election scheme must interpret operative
constitutional terms such as "manner," "election,"
"people," "form," and "method" according to their
original public meaning as reflected in
contemporaneous sources like Samuel Johnson's
1778 Dictionary of the English Language and in light
of Samuel Adams's warning that "the tools of a
tyrant pervert the plain meaning of words," and, if
the scheme or the precedents sustaining it are found
repugnant to the Constitution, whether all
subsequent judicial decisions and state actions that
depend on that invalid foundation must themselves
be treated as void, overruled, and reverted as if it
never happened.

Whether a State may enact election laws that make success in a State-run party primary a mandatory prerequisite to appearing on the November general-election ballot, thereby converting the primary into an additional 'qualifying race' and stripping candidates and voters of their constitutional rights