1. Whether a federal court may dismiss a discrimination complaint at the pleading stage by crediting only the plaintiffs alternative theory of unlawful consideration —framed in response to the defendant 's stated justification —while ignoring the plaintiffs primary theory of outright non-consideration based on race and unconstitutional conduct, contrary to Federal Rules and Civil Procedures §8 ("Rule 8") and this Court 's precedent on alternative pleading. Rule 8(d)(3), Rule 8(e); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Gelboim v. Bank of Am., 574 U.S. 405 (2015).

2. Whether courts adjudicating Title VII, §1981, and Fourteenth Amendment claims must incorporate protective state anti-discrimination laws under 42 U.S.C. §1988 ("§1988 ")—such as NYSHRL §§292(19), 296(l)(h) and 300—where federal law lacks analogous rules on comparators and exceptions/exemptions or boundaries of civil service hiring standards. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983).

3. Whether a public-school district 's stated reason for rejecting a Black civil service applicant is constitutionally "legitimate " under the Equal Protection Clause and §1981 when its hiring process violated the NY Constitution 's mandate that civil service appointments be based, when practicable, on reviewable competitive examinations of merit and fitness among qualified candidates only. NY Constitution 5§6; Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023).

4. Whether a federal court may dismiss discrimination claims by disregarding unrebutted allegations of statistically exclusionary outcomes —including a documented "inexorable zero " in principal appointments and unchanging racial hiring shares —where the employer 's policies occurred in a zero-sum selection context and there existed less discriminatory alternatives. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023).

5. Whether under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, courts may reject a facially plausible McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of discrimination at the pleading stage based solely on the employer 's unsworn justification —without drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor, taking judicial notice of inculpatory public facts, or enforcing discovery-based rebuttal requirements, particularly in civil rights cases. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (dissent); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015); FRE 201; Rule 12(f).

Whether a federal court may dismiss a discrimination complaint at the pleading stage by crediting only the plaintiffs alternative theory of unlawful consideration while ignoring the plaintiffs primary theory of outright non-consideration based on race and unconstitutional conduct