I.
Whether the undefined statutory language, "intangible
right of honest services," in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is
unconstitutionally vague.

II.
Whether the undefined statutory terms, "fictitious sale"
and "not a true and bona fide price," in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)
are unconstitutionally vague.

III.
Whether the government's criminal prosecution of
petitioner for insider-trading under 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and
17 C.F.R. § 180.1 – the first such prosecution in the
United States – violates due process because ordinary
people were not on fair notice at the time of the charged
offense that § 9(1) and § 180.1 made insider-trading in the
commodity futures context a criminal offense.

IV.
Whether the criminal prosecution of petitioner under
§ 9(1) and § 180.1 violates the separation-of-powers
doctrine because (1) Congress may not constitutionally
delegate to an executive agency the power to define
what primary conduct is subject to criminal liability
and (2) § 9(1) does not provide an intelligible principle
for delegation of legislative authority to define criminal
conduct to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Whether the undefined statutory language 'intangible right of honest services' in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague