1. Whether a federal agency may, consistent with the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and EEOC regulations,
redefine a security screening requirement —such as a
counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP)
examination —as an "essential job function, " thereby
eliminating the duty to provide reasonable
accommodation to employees whose documented
medical conditions render them unsuitable for such
testing.

2. Whether mandatory Department of Defense
regulations, including DoDI 5210.91 —which (a)
prohibit adverse administrative action based solely on
an unresolved polygraph result and (b) require
medical deferral or exemption for individuals who are
psychologically or medically unsuited for testing —are
judicially enforceable under the Rehabilitation Act, or
instead may be disregarded under a theory of
unreviewable "security discretion. " (App. F)

3. Whether courts may extend Department of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), beyond clearance
adjudications to cover ordinary personnel and
medical accommodation decisions, effectively placing
federal employees ' statutory rights outside judicial
review even when no security clearance has been
suspended, revoked, or unfavorably adjudicated.

4. Whether an agency that categorically refuses to
consider disability-based accommodations or to
engage in the interactive process required by 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2( g)(3) may nevertheless be deemed to
have acted lawfully under the Rehabilitation Act
when its justifications are shifting, medically
unsupported, and contrary to its own binding
regulations.

Whether a federal agency may redefine a security screening requirement as an 'essential job function' and eliminate reasonable accommodation duties under the Rehabilitation Act