1. Whether federal district court abuses its descretion under
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. S. Ct (12022), when it denies
a motion for compassionate release/RIS under §3582(c)(1)(AJ without
addressing specific, non-frivolous factual arguments tied to the
definitions of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" in U.S.S.G.
§1B1.13 and the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)?

2. Whether a court violates the party-presentation principle re
affirmed in Concepcion when itdenies a complex § 3582 (c)(1)(A)
motion without ordering the Government to respond, and instead
relieS/on its own untested assumptions ?

3. Whether a denial of compassionate release/ RIS based on clearly
erroneous factual findings such as stating that a defendant has
a lengthy criminal history and drug use that do no exist in the
record constitutes re variable abuse of discretion and a violation
of due process ?

4. Whether a court abuses its discretion by ignoring uncontrovert
ed, professional medical evidence including medical records and
swarn testimony from multiple licensed medical providers without
explanation, even when the evidence satisfies the applicable def-
nitions of "extraordinary and compelling reasons"?

5. When a district court compounds and amplifies it's abuse of
discretion to the point where the court wholly abandons its role
as a neutral and detached fact finder, does this result, demand
de novo review as required by the Fifth and "Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause?

Whether federal district courts abuse their discretion under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A) when denying compassionate release motions without addressing specific factual arguments tied to 'extraordinary and compelling reasons,' without requiring government response, based on clearly erroneous factual findings, while ignoring uncontroverted medical evidence, and whether such denials constitute reversible abuse of discretion and due process violations requiring de novo review