WHETHER THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COMMITTED ERROR AND VIOLATED
THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY IGNORING DECADES OF
THIS COURT'S CONTROLLING PRECEDENT REGARDING A SENTENCING
COURT'S BROAD SENTENCING DISCRETION AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
OF THE CONTROLLING SENTENCING STATUTES, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) AND
§ 3553(e), THAT ALLOW A DISTRICT COURT IMPOSING CONDIGN
SENTENCE THE DISCRETION TO GRANT A VARIANCE BASED ON § 3553(a)
FACTORS IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATE OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING LAW TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE THAT IS "SUFFICIENT, BUT
NOT GREATER THAN NECESSARY" TO REFLECT THE SERIOUSNESS OF
THE OFFENSE, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW, ADEQUATELY DETER
CRIMINAL CONDUCT, AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, EVEN AFTER GRANTING A
GOVERNMENT MOTION RECOGNIZING A DEFENDANTS SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE FILED UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), AND WHETHER THE MERE
FACT THAT A MOTION FOR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE IS FILED AND
GRANTED CREATES A SECONDARY MINIMUM MANDATORY LIMITING
THE DISTRICT COURT AND ONLY ALLOWING FOR A SENTENCE AT THE
BOTTOM OF WHATEVER THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES' SENTENCING
RANGE RESULTS FROM ONLY THE DEFENDANT'S COOPERATION AND
COMPLETELY IGNORING ANY OTHER APPLICABLE § 3553(a)(2)
FACTORS?

Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that a district court lacks sentencing discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to impose a variance based on § 3553(a) factors after granting a government motion for substantial assistance under § 3553(e), thereby violating the petitioner's due process rights and Supreme Court precedent regarding judicial sentencing discretion