1. Did the Ninth Circuit Panel err in a federal habeas case where, following an ex parte contact during trial between multiple jurors and a key prosecution cooperating witness and her non-testifying friend one business day before the jury began deliberations, the friend vouched for the truthfulness of the cooperating prosecution witness and urged them to concentrate on certain prosecution evidence over other evidence, the Ninth Circuit Panel required the defendant to prove prejudice sufficient to grant a mistrial, rather than observing the presumption of prejudice and placing the burden on the prosecution to rebut that presumption and prove lack of prejudice, as required by the clearly established Supreme Court precedents of Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) and their progeny?

2. Did the Ninth Circuit Panel err when it ruled in a federal habeas case that the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554 (2003), which created the state court rule described above that eliminated the presumption of prejudice and shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense contrary to this Court's clearly established precedents, and which was used by the state court below to uphold the denial of two motions for a new trial, did not violate this Court's precedents in Remmer I, supra, Mattox, supra, Parker, supra and their progeny?

3. Are the issues set forth above important questions of federal law that have not been, but should be, settled by this Court?

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in requiring a defendant to prove prejudice rather than applying a presumption of prejudice when jurors have ex parte contact with a prosecution witness before deliberations, contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent in Remmer v. United States, Mattox v. United States, and Parker v. Gladden