Jason Steven Kokinda v. United States
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess
Did the lower courts commit plain error requiring summary reversal by reinterpreting the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, (construed by the unanimous Supreme Court panel in Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324 (2016),) to thereby criminalize a law-abiding modus operandi of never staying longer than state law allows unregistered visitors and moving on?
Is the term "habitually lives" merely ambiguous in isolation, or subject to the rule of lenity, in any regard, because the Attorney General was not delegated specific authority to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2250 in compliance with judicial canons and lacked the expertise required to provide Skidmore deference post-Loper Light?
Did the lower courts commit plain error by reinterpreting the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 to criminalize a law-abiding modus operandi of moving between states?