Whether the appellate affirmance of the district court's sentence reduction denial overlooked A) that the district court was disqualified because the district judge(s) was (were) consistent US. Attorney prosecuting petitioner's case and/or represented the US. Attorney's office after leaving that position in private practice but also represented a victim in private practice; B) that the district court based its sentence reduction denial on its counterfactual misconstruction of defendant's mens rea which has no support in evidence, fact, nor the record beyond contradicts the government's closing argument in 1948 when the jury wasted the intent was unknown; C) that it used the wrong standard of review to scrutinize the district court's denials, which required a de novo (case qualification) and clearly errs (present content) standard; D) that the district court's denial of recusal upon motion's motion violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as well as the collateral estoppel doctrine on the mens rea issue.

Whether nonadjudicated and/or unconstitutionally adjudicated habeas claims from a 1948 collateral attack left with a nonfinal judgment can serve as extraordinary compelling reasons for 18 USC 3553(a) under (1) sentence reductions?

Whether the haphazard 18 USC 3553(4) adjudications across Federal courts violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause and if not, are such variances unconstitutional vagaries that meet the fundamental defect test of Hill vs. U.S. 348 US 414 (463) on the miscarriage of justice test?

Whether the Due Process and/or Equal Protection Clauses violated by a criminal conviction and/or sentence reduction denial that results from overwhelming evidence of actus reus but lacking conclusive non inference piling tests of mens rea in an unsuccessful insanity defense case?

Whether the appeals court violated petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause and/or Equal Protection Clause by not previously appointed appellate counsel's Benjamin or Scott Holbrook or appointing a new counsel under the court's hitherto unmentioned "exceptional circumstances" test it used to deny petitioner's requests for counsel assistance without ever having established the test criteria for appointing post-conviction appellate counsel in this (6th) circuit nor defining the criteria in this case or any other previous case?

Whether the vacation of the conviction and sentence, or merely the sentence reduction denial, of the district court by this Court is warranted in this case under 16 USC 2106 remand provisions authorizing this Court to remand the cause of action directing entry of such appropriate judgment as may be just under the circumstances based on the facts of this unusual case?

Whether the district court's sentence reduction denial violated due process and equal protection rights due to judicial disqualification and misinterpretation of mens rea