The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any
debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity." 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In Kawaauhau v. Geiger , 523 U.S. 57
(1998), this Court unanimously held that this exception
covers only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury,
anchoring its analysis in the law of intentional torts. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes "injury,"
the invasion of a legally protected interest, from "harm,"
the existence of loss or detriment in fact. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 7(1) & cmt. a (1965). By using the
terms interchangeably, the federal courts of appeals have
fractured into distinct camps regarding the meaning of
"injury" and whether a debtor's subjective belief that his
conduct was lawful negates the intent to injure.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the term "injury" in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)
denotes mere "harm" (detriment in fact), as the Eleventh
Circuit held, or requires the intent to invade a legally
protected interest (legal injury), such that a debtor who
intentionally causes harm under a genuine but mistaken
belief of legal justification has not inflicted a "willful" injury.

2. Whether a debt arising from the intentional
tort of false imprisonment is nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) when the debtor held a subjective,
genuine belief that confinement would be lawful and
justified, or whether a court may obviate that subjective
belief by defining the "injury" as the confinement itself
and implying malice from the objective "excessiveness"
of the debtor's conduct.

Whether the term 'injury' in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires intent to invade a legally protected interest or merely denotes harm, and whether a debt from intentional tort is nondischargeable when the debtor genuinely believed their conduct was lawful