1) When considering the suppression of a prisoner's First Amendment right to
freedom of expression and association by a prison policy, is it possible
to guage if the policy is too broad sweeping without determining what the
policy covers?

2) Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determine what
new material was covered by the broadened definition of sexually explicit
image in the newly revised prison policy as its colleagues did in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals with a materially and factually indistinguishable
prison policy?

3) If a prisoner possesses personal property, whether by right or privilege,
does he enjoy a protected interest in that property that cannot be infringed^
on without due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

4) If prison administrators implement a new policy that retroactively makes
legally possessed property contraband, does the prisoner retain ownership
of the property if it is ultimately confiscated by prison officials?

5) If a prisoner's protected interest in legally possessed property translates
to ownership, and cannot be infringed upon without due process, should
there be additional safeguards in regards to the disposition of the property
if it is confiscated pursuant to prison policy?

6) If a supervisory official may be held liable under §1983 for his personal
involvement ■in a constitutional deprivation, is his role as a top official
that created and/or implemented prison policy which unconstitutional
practices occurred enough to establish a sufficient causal connection?

Whether prison policies restricting a prisoner's First Amendment rights and property interests can be challenged without fully defining the scope of the policy's restrictions