Mr. Jennings was deprived of counsel for three years before his death warrant was signed. On the day his death warrant was signed, the State requested that he be appointed counsel completely unfamiliar with him or his case. Newly appointed counsel had but seven days to investigate and prepare a final appeal for Mr. Jennings. The first and second questions presented are:

1. When the plain meaning of a statute or rule guarantees continuous state postconviction counsel to a capitally sentenced defendant, but fails to provide a remedy when a defendant is deprived of such counsel, does the State violate the Fourteenth Amendment in depriving the defendant due process and meaningful access to the courts because newly appointed counsel cannot meaningfully represent the defendant in his truncated under-warrant litigation?

2. Does Florida's mandatory statutory language requiring a capital defendant to be continuously represented in all state postconviction proceedings create a protected property interest?

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), this Court invalidated the death penalty because it was imposed arbitrarily and without meaningful guidance; in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), this Court upheld new death penalty statutes that introduced reliability, proportionality review, and guided discretion. Florida's system has since dismantled those very safeguards, eliminating proportionality review, restoring non-unanimous jury recommendations, adding aggravators and death-eligible crimes, and conducting clemency and the choice of who receives a death warrant in secrecy. The third question presented is:

3. Whether this systemic regression violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by abandoning the evolving standards of decency and reliability that Furman and Gregg established as prerequisites for the fair and consistent imposition of capital punishment?

When the plain meaning of a statute or rule guarantees continuous state postconviction counsel to a capitally sentenced defendant, but fails to provide a remedy when a defendant is deprived of such counsel, does the State violate the Fourteenth Amendment in depriving the defendant due process and meaningful access to the courts because newly appointed counsel cannot meaningfully represent the defendant in his truncated under-warrant litigation?