1. Petitioner Kara Sternquist's prior convictions are old and nonviolent. She has no history of being dangerous, but was herself a victim of violent crime. She possessed guns in her home, for purposes of self defense. The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Ms. Sternquist because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm citizens like her, who have only remote-in-time, nonviolent prior felony convictions.

2. The United States Code defines a "firearm silencer," in relevant part, as "any device for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable firearm." Here, Ms. Sternquist possessed cylindrical tubes that had no holes drilled in them and could not be used to silence, muffle, or diminish the sound of a gunshot without modification. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"), however, concluded that a hole is not necessary for a cylindrical tube to be a "silencer," so long as the tube has a "reference point" where a hole could be drilled. The question presented is whether ATF's definition of "silencer" as including tubes that do not have holes drilled in them is contrary to the statutory definition of "silencer," and whether, following Loper Light Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), it is error for the courts to defer entirely to ATF's definition without conducting their own analysis.

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional for permanently disarming citizens with remote, nonviolent prior felony convictions and whether ATF's definition of 'silencer' exceeds statutory authority